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Abstract
Following the national uptick of violence across the country, societal angst has once
again begun to surface. Those in positions of authority began to look to the criminal justice
system for ways to address this cyclical issue. Traditionally, applying law enforcement
crackdowns and increased penalties and sanctions to the offenders were the main topics of
discussion. However, over the last two decades, problem-oriented policing has begun to emerge.
Problem-oriented policing works to identify why things are going wrong and to frame responses
using a wide variety of often untraditional approaches (Goldstein 1979). One of the problemoriented frameworks known as the “pulling levers” focused deterrence strategy, looked to
prevent gang and group involved violence.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of the long-term
effectiveness of focused deterrence programs that have been implemented across the country
over the last two decades. How well do these anti-violence, focused-deterrence programs work?
This study will be broken down into two parts: (1) a violent crime rate analysis of five (5)
focused deterrence programs across the United States; and (2) a detailed programmatic
evaluation of the Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination (BRAVE) program.
Most of the current literature that relates to focused deterrence programs have evaluated
the programs based on their pre-crime rates and crime rates during the duration of the program.
Many of these programs have been realized only to have them fade out over time. This
dissertation will focus on two general research questions:
1. Is the violent crime rate responsive to various focused deterrence programs?
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2. Once these programs disappear, is there a whiplash effect (spike) in crime rates in
those particular communities where the focused deterrence programs have been
implemented?
The findings of the study indicate that where focused deterrence initiatives are
implemented, there are noticeable positive impacts on violent crime in the targeted
neighborhoods. Within the first year of the post-intervention period in the cities studied, the
violent crime rate in the targeted areas fell anywhere from approximately 20% to 70%.
However, during the two years following the conclusion of the initiatives, two of the cities,
Baton Rouge and Los Angeles – Hollenbeck, had immediate spikes in violent crime while
Boston and Lowell showed a significant spike in year two. Only Cincinnati showed a two-year
decrease in violent crime but spiked noticeably in the third year. This data suggests that once the
focused deterrence initiatives are no longer in place, the crime rate begins to rise again thus
indicating a whiplash effect. Additionally, the programmatic evaluation of the BRAVE initiative
highlighted noteworthy fidelity to the program. Through interviews, all eight respondents
indicated that BRAVE was administered as per the Group Violence Intervention Implementation
Guide. Nevertheless, as time went on, obstacles like employee turnover, logistics, community
problems and political internal strife contributed to the downfall of the program.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
Crime in the United States has been a major concern for sociological researchers since
before the twentieth century. Contemporary research into this challenging and demanding
societal disturbance reflects an assortment of theories about, and predictors of crime, as well as a
host of approaches to control and decrease overall offender rates. The consensus among experts
and researchers in the field of sociology however corroborates the fact that crime is a dynamic,
multidimensional issue with a variety of causal factors. Consequently, researchers and other
specialists suggest that dealing with this issue must focus not only on the present concern of the
offender’s deviant conduct, but on every component associated with the background of that
behavior as well, including environment, family relations, peer relations, as well as social
support services and various networks.
1.2 Problem Statement
According to the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) 1 (2018), the number of arrests reported in
the United States in 2016 was around 10.7 million. Contrary to popular belief, the number of
arrests in the U.S. has been declining consistently since 2007. In Crime in the United States
2006, the number of arrests reported was 14,209,365 (Figure 1). This was a 25% decrease over a
ten-year period. Disaggregating these numbers to focus specifically on violent crime 2 and
property crime 3, the downward trend began in 2007 and 2010, respectively (Figure 2). However,
beginning in 2014, the number of violent crime arrests appeared to be increasing.

Periodic nationwide assessment of reported crimes compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics retrieved from the
National Archive of Criminal Justice Data
2
Per the FBI, violent crimes include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery and aggravated assault
3
Per the FBI, property crimes include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson
1
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Serious violence in the United States is concentrated in historically disadvantaged
communities of color, and particularly among young men in those communities (National
Network for Safe Communities 2018). Many of these young men associate themselves with
different groups or gangs that “represent” their specific neighborhoods. Neighborhoods
suffering from high rates of offending, hot spots within such neighborhoods, and high-rate
individuals within such neighborhoods and hot spots, are candidates for group and individual
style interventions (Kennedy 1997). The number of these anti-violence interventions have
increased over the last two decades. While various initiatives and interventions like cognitive
behavior strategies, gun buy backs, boot camps, and scared straight programs have been
implemented in various jurisdictions, none have been more successful than focused deterrence
initiatives (National Institute of Justice 1998).
Focused deterrence strategies (also referred to as “pulling levers” policing) are problemoriented policing strategies that follow the core principles of the deterrence theory (National
Institute of Justice 2018). What is perhaps most significant, from an organizational standpoint, is
that the problem-oriented policing model (including focused-deterrence) is achieved by (a)
diagnosing local problems, (b) using research to inform problem analysis, (c) developing
interagency partnerships to address local crime problems, and (d) customizing the operational
strategy locally to build long-term capacity (Corsaro and Engel 2015). In other words, problemoriented policing entails identifying, understanding, and solving the array of troubles that prompt
citizens repeatedly to call on the police for service and assistance (Reisig 2010). Focused
deterrence strategies seek to change offender behavior by understanding underlying crimeproducing dynamics and conditions that sustain recurring crime problems and by implementing a
blended strategy of law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service actions
4

(Kennedy 1997, 2008). The broad concept of focused deterrence is to move law enforcement
forces away from random non-strategic strikes based merely on random intelligence flows, or
from blanket zero tolerance approaches against low-level offenders, and toward strategic
selectivity and to give counter-crime operation enhanced impact (Felbab-Brown 2013).
One of the most consistent findings in criminological research is that a small subset of
offenders is responsible for a large proportion of crime (Loeber and Farrington 1998).
According to the Crime Prevention Research Center (2017), breaking down the most dangerous
counties where homicides occur in the United States, over half of the murders occur in just 2% of
the counties (Figure 3 & 4). Relatedly, Robert Muggah reported that over 95% of violence in the
United States is concentrated in 5% of street addresses, further revealing that most crime occurs
in highly concentrated areas of the city (Krisch, Eisner, Mikton and Butchart 2015). Many of
these serial offenders commit a wide variety of offenses, consistently abuse alcohol and other
drugs, frequently hurt and are hurt by one another, associate with one another, sometimes by
choice and sometimes through simple geographic and social proximity, are often arrested, often
on probation and parole, and often incarcerated; and often provoke in one another self-protective
and other responses to exacerbate their offending (Kennedy 1997). Whether identified as violent
groups or gangs, individuals in these networks, have been the subject of scores of different antiviolence initiatives over the past several decades (Engel, Tillyer and Corsaro 2013).

5

Figure 3. 95% of Homicides Occur in 2% of US Counties
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Figure 4. Percentage of Murders

1.3 Research Objectives
This purpose of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of the long-term
effectiveness of focused deterrence programs that have been implemented across the country
over the last two decades. How well do these anti-violence, focused-deterrence programs work?
This study will be broken down into two parts: (1) a violent crime rate analysis of five (5)
focused deterrence programs across the United States; and (2) a detailed programmatic
evaluation of the Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination (BRAVE) program.
Most of the current literature that relates to focused deterrence programs have evaluated
the programs based on their pre-crime rates and crime rates during the duration of the program.
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Many of these programs have been realized only to have them fade out over time. This
dissertation will focus on two general research questions:
1. Is the violent crime rate responsive to various focused deterrence programs?
2. Once these programs disappear, is there a whiplash effect (spike) in crime rates in
those particular communities where the focused deterrence programs have been
implemented?
The objective of this research is two-fold. This first objective of this research is to
evaluate various focused deterrence programs by analyzing violent crime data rates for two years
following the conclusion of the programs to determine if there is a whiplash effect in the crime
rates once the programs are no longer in operation. The second objective of this research is to
look specifically at the Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination program and conduct a thorough
programmatic evaluation of the program to measure the effectiveness of the program as well as
the programmatic fidelity and successes of the program.
In order to fully understand and address the research questions, the remainder of this
dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 offers a detailed literature review that provides
some historical context of structural issues like poverty and deviant subcultures as they directly
relate to violent crime. The chapter also delves into the issue of race and crime and examines
how socioeconomic factors and the racial composition of a geographic area affect crime rates.
The chapter also includes a review of the theoretical perspectives that specifically apply to
violent crime in neighborhoods that experience high rates of violence. Additionally, the chapter
gives a brief summary of various programmatic interventions that have been applied in various
jurisdictions across the United States. Chapter 3 will outline the methodology of this study while
8

Chapter 4 will be an analysis of the data gathered from the research. Finally, Chapter 5 will
provide a discussion and summary of the major findings of the study along with limitations of
the research, as well as suggestions for future research.

9

Chapter 2. Literature Review and Research
2.1

Factors and Processes that Generate Crime
There are a myriad of challenges that could be perceived as the impetus to crime and

violence in our communities, specifically structural issues.
2.1.1

Poverty and Crime
According to the Census Bureau (2016), in 2015, some 43.1 million people, or 13.5

percent of the United States population lived in poverty. People with incomes below the official
government poverty level (the amount of income necessary for a family to maintain a minimally
adequate diet) are considered to be living in poverty (Warner 1999). Poverty, therefore, is by
definition a life-threatening condition (Warner 1999), that government officials have historically
attempted to address.
Since Shaw and McKay’s groundbreaking study, the theoretical link between poverty and
crime has been debated by a number of researchers. When looking at the link between poverty
and crime at the macro level, one must remember that committing crime does not require an
individual to, in fact, be poor; it only requires that they reside in a poor community which tends
to shape their life’s opportunities. For instance, the effect of poverty on violent crime has been
explained in terms of: (1) persistent poverty, where individuals react to conditions of absolute
and relative deprivation; (2) underclass poverty, where nonconventional attitudes and behaviors
produce a subculture of violence; and (3) “ghetto poverty” (Wilson 1996), where the spatial
concentration of extreme poverty produces social isolation from mainstream society (Stretesky,
Schuck and Hogan 2004) and a number of structural variables, as well. The hypothesis that
poverty and crime may exhibit a threshold effect (Hipp and Yates 2011), builds on the theoretical
model of Wilson (1987) that notes that race and poverty in the United States are nearly
10

indistinguishable and it focuses on how structural transformations can give rise to increased
social isolation and the deterioration of social buffers in neighborhoods with high levels of
poverty. In other words, macro level research has been used in attempts to isolate characteristics
of communities, cities, or even societies that lead to high rates of crime (Shihadeh and
Steffensmeier 1994).
William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) brought the potential negative
consequences of socially isolated neighborhoods to the forefront of urban race and poverty
research. According to Wilson (1987), economic restructuring in the United States during the
past few decades had severe implications for the dynamics of many metropolitan areas, where
changing patterns of economic investment moved jobs from city cores to outer rings. Once these
jobs relocated to the suburbs, this made it extremely hard for the disadvantaged and those with
no form of transportation to commute to these places, thereby leaving inner city residents
stranded with little to no means to gain income. As this began to be a recurring theme,
concentrated poverty began to settle in. Concentrated poverty exists in areas where there is a
highly concentrated clustering of poor, disadvantaged individuals. These areas are characterized
by a large proportion of society that lack education and job skills, where individuals experience
long-term poverty and/or welfare dependency, have disproportionately high rates of
unemployment, violence and crime and are socially isolated from other mainstream institutions
(Mitchell-Dix 2015). Concentrated areas of poverty isolate residents from interaction with
conventional mainstream society and its norms and patterns as well as interaction with
individuals belonging to class and race groups that are different from their own (Mitchell-Dix
2015). Existing research suggests that segregated minorities rarely venture outside of their
communities (Wilson 1987), so even in those instances where highly segregated minority
11

neighborhoods are adjacent to more affluent neighborhoods, segregated residents may remain
isolated from outside opportunities (Atkins 2009). Socially isolated neighborhoods limit
residents’ access to quality institutions such as schools, businesses and jobs (Mitchell-Dix 2015).
When this occurs, prospects for those individuals are very limited.
Research on the neighborhood effects, which refers to the various social, cultural and
demographic neighborhood conditions of residents, suggests that concentrated neighborhood
poverty increases the likelihood of social isolation from mainstream institutions, joblessness,
dropping out of school, lower educational achievement, involvement in crime, unsuccessful
behavioral development and delinquency among adolescents, non-marital childbirth and
unsuccessful family management (Wilson 2013). The traditional focus in criminology has been
at the individual level and concerns whether broken homes produce delinquents (Shihadeh and
Steffensmeier 1994). Shihadeh and Steffensmeier (1994), building on prior studies on
communities and crime, looked at the importance of community family structure and the direct
and indirect effects of income inequality on rates of black urban violence. Ultimately, they
determined by focusing on the mediating dimensions of community social organization (e.g.
family structure) to understand variation in black violence across cities, they advocate the value
of community-level perspective that leads away from a “kinds of people” analysis to a focus on
how structural characteristics of collectivities foster violence (Sampson 1985; Peterson and
Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Krivo and Peterson
1996, 2000).
Poverty and its relationship to crime is studied from different perspectives. The social
reform movement of the early twentieth century, responding to the dislocations that accompanied
rapid industrialization, prompted a number of descriptive studies on poverty in urban areas
12

(Wilson 1987). Due to the poverty and lack of social organization in communities early on,
Shaw and McKay’s (1942) concluded in their groundbreaking study that three urban conditions
promote high delinquency rates: poverty, heterogeneity, and mobility with poverty being the
most important factor (Blau and Blau 1982). This development laid the groundwork for social
disorganization theory. According to the theory, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity and
weak social networks decrease a neighborhoods capacity to control the behavior of people in
public, and hence increases the likelihood of crime (Kubrin and Wietzer 2003). Because of this
observation, research has shown a link between crime and poverty at the macro and micro levels.
At the micro level, studies delve into the reasons that motivate poor people to commit crime. In
contrast, examination of the link between poverty and crime at the macro level proposes that one
that resides in a poor community is more likely to get involved with crime because the
disadvantages that they experience limit their opportunities.
2.1.2

Race and Crime
In Wilson’s The Declining Significance of Race, he outlined the three stages of American

race relations. According to Wilson (1978):
My basic thesis is that American society has experienced three major stages of
black-white contact and that each stage embodies a different form of racial
stratification structured by the particular arrangement of both the economy and the
polity. Stage one coincides with antebellum slavery and the early post-bellum era
and may be designated the period of the plantation economy and the early racialcaste oppression. Stage two begins in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ends
at roughly the New Deal era, and may be identified as the period of industrial
expansion, class conflict and racial oppression. Finally, stage three is associated
with the modern, industrial, post-World War II era, which really began to crystallize
during the 1960’s and 1970’s, and may be characterized as the period of progressive
transition from racial inequalities to class inequalities. (P. 2 – 3)
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Mainstream sociological research has focused principally on the structural manifestations
of race, racism, and discrimination, particularly as they characterize black-white relations
(Wilson 1987). The origins of black oppositional culture can be traced to the period before 1920,
when black migration fomented a hardening of white racial attitudes and a systematic limiting of
opportunities for African Americans on a variety of fronts (Massey and Denton 1993). Whereas
urban blacks had zealously pursued education after the Civil War and were making great strides,
the rise of Jim Crow in the South and de facto segregation in the north severed the links between
hard work, education, sobriety and their presumed forwards in society (Massey and Denton
1993).
Many researchers have argued that high rates of violence among urban black populations
are a product of social isolation. Social isolation is defined as a “lack of contact or of sustained
interaction with individuals and institutions that represent mainstream society” (Wilson
1987:60); social isolation is thought to be associated with high rates of black violence because it
reduces the level of social organization and informal control in black communities (Wilson
1987). Agreeing with Wilson, Massey and Denton (1993) suggested that harmful neighborhood
conditions occur in the black community because segregation concentrates poverty to build a set
of mutually reinforcing and self-feeding spirals of decline in black neighborhoods. When
economic dislocations deprive a segregated group of employment and increase its rate of
poverty, socioeconomic deprivation inevitably becomes more concentrated in neighborhoods
where that group lives (Massey and Denton 1993). In short, sociologists have suggested that
when poverty becomes concentrated, it leads to social isolation. Furthermore, it has been well
documented that social isolation leads to crime, but there are bifurcated routes to that
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assumption. The following sections will explain the interracial and intraracial link to social
isolation.
2.1.2.1 Interracial Link
Residential segregation between blacks and whites is a pervasive aspect of racial
inequality in the United States (Peterson and Krivo 1993). In many cities in the United States,
there are clearly segregated neighborhoods that still exist. Those neighborhoods are visibly
distinguishable, in many instances, by their outward appearances. A growing body of research
suggests that separate black and white communities provide markedly different social
environments for their residents (Peterson and Krivo 1993). Parents in black underclass
communities may lose control over their children in neighborhoods that are disproportionately
female, have large numbers of teenagers relative to adults and lack supervised play areas which
tend to be characteristics associated with residence in unsafe and overcrowded high-rise public
housing (Hogan and Kitagawa 1985). Additionally, higher levels of unemployment, welfare
dependency, dilapidated housing, mortality, unwed motherhood, and crime pervade segregated
African American neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo 1993).
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) primarily associate the concentration of black
poverty and violent crime with racially based housing discrimination that locked Blacks into
spatial contexts offering few economic opportunities and little connection to mainstream
economic, political and cultural life. Their fundamental argument is that racial segregation – and
its characteristic institutional form, the black ghetto – are the key structural factors responsible
for the perpetuation of black poverty in the United States (Massey and Denton 1993). Massey
and Denton (1993) put forward that the black ghetto was constructed through a series of welldefined institutional practices, private behaviors, and public policies by which whites sought to
15

contain growing urban black populations. Prejudice and discrimination were instrumental in the
housing market producing residential environments that are separated largely along racial lines.
That assumption was confirmed by the way that most immigrant groups (e.g. Italians, Poles, and
Jews) had an easier route to inclusion in American society. As their socioeconomic status rose
and generations spent in the United States rose, each group progressively integrated (Massey and
Denton 1993). For Blacks, higher incomes did not buy entrée to residential circumstances that
could serve as springboards for future socioeconomic mobility (Massey and Denton 1993), but
upwardly mobile whites, capitalized on their higher incomes to buy their way to improved
residential circumstances (Massey and Denton 1993) and away from black neighbors.
2.1.2.2 Intraracial Link
In the years during and after World War II, black agricultural migrants to cities faced
enormous problems, but they had two advantages. The first was the presence of manufacturing
jobs, the traditional port of entry to the urban economy for uneducated men (Wilson 1987). The
second was residential segregation that forced recent migrants, working class black and middleclass Blacks to live in close proximity to each other (Wilson 1987).
The beginning of the end was the movement of manufacturing jobs away from the central
cities of the north and Midwest, a process that began as soon as World War II ended (Wilson
1987). In The Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson (1987) argued that the exodus of blue-collar
production and manufacturing jobs coupled with the suburbanization of the black middle class –
facilitated in part by the expansion of the civil rights movement – left behind a severely
impoverished and “socially isolated” segment of the black population referred to as the
underclass. It is important to note that this created a within race, class isolation concern.
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According to Wilson (1987), prior to the 1960’s black, inner city communities were far
more heterogeneous in socioeconomic mix and family structure because de facto and de jure
segregation bound together Blacks of all income levels. The working-class Blacks and middleclass Blacks formed neighborhoods where there was family stability, role models, activities for
youth and families as well as critical institutions like schools, churches, and neighborhood
organizations. Eventually, as argued by Wilson, it was the more economically stable Blacks who
disproportionality benefitted from civil rights gains, such as affirmative action and open housing,
which removed artificial barriers to job access and facilitated their exodus from ghetto
neighborhoods (Kasarda 1990).
Wilson (1987) suggested that many of the social problems (including crime) endemic to
Black urban ghettos are largely attributable to their weak institutional bases (Lee and Ousey
2005). According to this argument, deindustrialization and discriminatory residential practices
tied many Blacks to urban localities characterized by severe economic and social disadvantage,
resulting in a serious disconnect from mainstream society (Lee and Ousey 2005). Additionally,
with these middle-class black families exiting at the very time that forces of deindustrialization
were restructuring the urban economy, low skilled Blacks became effectively isolated from the
social networks and social institutions of the mainstream American middle class (Lee and Ousey
2005).
Another impediment was residential segregation, which permitted working class and
middle-class black families to move away from the poor (Wilson 1987). The result was a series
of neighborhoods, which were, according to Wilson (1987), economically and socially isolated,
and in which lower class behavior (i.e., the culture of poverty, the underclass) could flourish.
According to Sampson and Wilson (1995), it is within the vacuum of cultural social isolation,
17

fostered by concentrated disadvantage, that subcultures adaptations (or “cognitive landscapes”)
emerge in which violence is tolerated and expected as a part of everyday life. The Wilsonian
argument stresses that segregation by social class within the black community is particularly
harmful for community organization and social control (Lee and Ousey 2007).
Most whites insist minorities (especially Blacks) are the ones responsible for whatever
“race problem” we have in this country (Bonilla-Silva 2010). Meanwhile, the
overrepresentation of African Americans in violence, as both offenders and victims, remains a
controversial theoretical issue in criminology (McNulty 2001). Macro level research on the
relationship between race and violence has examined whether the effects of indicators of
structural disadvantage on violence vary significantly by race (McNulty 2001). The reality in
most major cities with substantial black populations is that the communities with very high levels
of disadvantage are predominately black (Sampson and Wilson 1995). Much explanation of the
relationship of race to crime, and other outcomes (e.g. labor market success) have focused on
“class” (Wilson 1987) as opposed to “race” (Massey and Denton 1993), as the critical factor.
However, race and class in the United States are so geographically conflated – consolidated in
social structure – that it may be impossible to differentiate empirically race from class effects
with macro level data (McNulty 2001).
2.1.3

Delinquency
Unfortunately, those over the age of 18 are not the only offenders. Those individuals

under the age of 18 who are arrested for breaking the law are referred to as delinquents.
Delinquency is a multifarious social problem that affects members of society and processes of a
social structure. Juvenile delinquency is defined as “an act committed by a minor that violates
the penal code of the government with authority over the area in which the act occurs” (Bartollas
18

and Schmallenger 2011:3). Simply stated, it refers to a set of behaviors that are not consistent
with the collective practices and/or ethics of the dominant social group. Essentially, these
behaviors deviate from societal norms and more specifically, they violate established criminal
codes and laws. Delinquency combines not only various forms of criminal activity, but also
conduct that is only unlawful for juveniles such as running away from home and truancy. These
types of offenses are known as status offenses. Juveniles who live in unstable homes and social
environments are deemed to be “at-risk” children because of their vulnerability to detrimental
influences (Weeks 1943).
Delinquency affects members of society and processes of a social structure. It has long
been described as a companionate activity that typically involves co-offenders (Haynie and
Osgood 2005). The ubiquitous tendency to choose friends who are similar to oneself holds for
qualities ranging from age, sex and race to attitudes, personality and behavior (Blau 1977).
Hirschi (1969) argued that delinquent youth have no other choice for friends except for other
delinquents.
Most pressing problems facing juveniles revolve around five issues: poverty, health and
mortality problems, substandard living conditions and inadequate education (Duncan, Yeung,
Brooks-Gunn and Smith 1998). Additionally, research has shown that along with structural
factors, family stability, parenting style, parental supervision, and personal characteristics of
parent and child all have a substantial risk on delinquency (Cheng 2004). The theoretical
perspectives relating to delinquency has focused on these major issues and groundbreaking
research has been conducted to determine if these structural issues are correlated.
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2.1.4 Group/Gang Violence
Though street gangs have been a part of America’s cities since the late nineteenth
century, the awareness that crime and delinquency occur more frequently in gangs is perhaps
more prevalent in today’s society than ever before (Vowell and May 2000). The Highlights of
the 2010 National Youth Gang Survey estimated that the United States has 29,400 gangs and
756,000 gang members (Bartollas and Schmalleger 2014). It has been argued that because gangs
attract adolescents whose families fail to fulfill the basic emotional and social needs, unattached
and unsupervised children are more likely to affiliate with gangs because they function as
“surrogate families” and provide a sense of belonging (Walker-Barnes and Mason 2001). Gangs
are seen as both the byproduct of neighborhood social conditions (Shaw and McKay 1942) and
important forms of neighborhood social organization in their own right (Venkatesh 2000). Gang
involvement and delinquency, especially serious and violent crime, have been consistently
related across numerous empirical studies in various contexts and across different time periods
(Fox, Ward and Lane 2013). Gangs and their members have received considerable attention from
police, policy makers and researchers for nearly a century (Melde and Esbensen 2013).
Consequently, there have been numerous strategies employed in order to reduce gangs and their
detrimental impact on society (Tolle 2017). One gang violence reduction strategy – focused
deterrence – has been implemented in many cities, and is growing in popularity among
practitioners, politicians, community groups, researchers, and funding agencies (e.g. through
Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods) (Braga
and Weisburd 2011).
The word gang is a variant of gangue or gangr, which originally meant a band or group
that formed together for a journey (The American Heritage Dictionary 2000). Over time, the
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definition of gang has shifted from a group of people who band together for any reason (beyond
taking a journey) to a focus on the collective action of a group of people, especially those
engaged in delinquent or criminal activity (Delaney 2014). The federal definition of the word
gang used by the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration
and Customs Enforcement is more specific (National Institute of Justice 2011) and is defined as:
1. An association of three or more individuals;
2. Whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity, which
they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation, frequently by employing one or
more of the following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other
physical marking, style or color clothing, hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti;
3. Whose purpose in part is to engage in criminal activity and which uses violence or
intimidation to further its criminal objectives;
4. Whose members engage in criminal activity or acts of juvenile delinquency that if
committed by an adult would be crimes with the intent to enhance or preserve the
association’s power, reputation or economic resources; and
5. The association may also possess some of the following characteristics:
a. The members employ rules for joining and operating within an association;
b. The members may meet on a recurring basis;
c. The association may provide physical protection of its members from others;
d. The association may seek to exercise control over a particular geographic location
or region, or it may simply defend its perceived interests against rivals; and
e. The association may have an identifiable structure.
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Gangs tend to form through ties of friendship. Youth gangs, which began to flourish in
Chicago and other large cities in the nineteenth century as immigration and population shifts
reached peak levels, were primarily Irish, Jewish and Italian (Bartollas and Schmalleger 2014).
Because attending school was not required, the children of immigrants assembled and tarried in
groups throughout the neighborhood during the day. These gangs fulfilled the social needs of
adolescent boys thereby offering them a rite of passage from adolescent into adulthood (Bartollas
and Schmalleger 2014).
Disadvantaged neighborhoods have traditionally been viewed as fertile soil for gang
formation (Thrasher 1927). Based on extensive field research, Elijah Anderson asserts that a
“code of the streets” has emerged in impoverished, inner city communities (McNulty and Bellair
2003). Born out of a profound sense of frustration and despair – rooted in scarce mainstream
employment opportunities and lack of faith in the ability of police to provide protection – the
code reflects an informal set of rules that dictate how to respond to perceived attacks on personal
dignity and safety (McNulty and Bellair 2003). Accordingly, upon being victimized, children
are encouraged to pay back the perpetrator in kind and learn to display a predisposition to act
violently so that they can avoid being a target in the future (McNulty and Bellair 2003).
Studies of adolescent gangs have historically placed great emphasis upon the influence of
ecological contexts (Walker-Barnes and Mason 2004). Indeed, early theoretical and empirical
studies of gang formation and gang membership focused upon neighborhood characteristics such
as community disorganization, poverty, crime, lack of social capital, and barriers to economic
opportunities (Decker and Van Winkle 1996). Later research expanded to consider factors
related to family, peer, and school environments (Walker-Barnes and Mason 2001).
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Preventing adolescents from joining gangs should be a top priority. Various opportunities
for success in life by means of access to resources like education, health care and economic
advancement must be provided to them. At the same time, a community’s social control of pregang and gang groups needs to be increased (Howell and Decker 1999). The United States
Department of Justice has made gang prevention and intervention a primary focus and has
targeted a public health approach to combat gangs under the assumption that “targeting a small,
high-risk population can have significant, broader benefits (Holder 2009). Communities’
comprehensive, coordinated approaches should include measures to increase social control of
youth by strengthening social institutions and emphasizing the roles that residents, parents, youth
workers, and community leaders play in supervising adolescents (Howell and Decker 1999).
2.1.5 Social Disorganization Theory
Prior to the 20th century, American criminology had drawn from its European heritage
and supported popular Positivist explanations of crime, usually of the biological variety
(Williams and McShane 2004). Biological theories of crime focus on identifying and
understanding qualities or characteristics of individuals and showing how the presence (or
absence) of some chemical, hormonal, or physical structure in our bodies is related to
participation in illegal activities (Miller, Schreck and Tewksbury 2011). Many of the Positivist
criminological theories linked criminality to heredity, intelligence and psychological
deficiencies. A change in this perspective came with the rise of cultural, as opposed to biological
theories of the behavior of individuals and groups (Williams and McShane 2004).
American sociologists have been fascinated with the origins and social life of local
neighborhoods almost since the time that the discipline was first formally organized into a
department at the University of Chicago in 1892 (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). The diverse
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group of scholars associated with the department were collectively referred to as the “Chicago
School” of sociology and criminology (Williams and McShane 2004). The Department of
Sociology at the University of Chicago was never known as a center for sociological theory;
rather, its reputation was as a center for empirical research and theory about particular
phenomena: delinquency, gangs, vice, suicide, family disorganization, institutions (Short 2002).
Chicago, Illinois was one of the cities in the United States where the population grew
rapidly. Between the incorporation of Chicago in the 1830’s and 1910, the population of the city
had grown from 4,000 people to more than two million, and this growth was associated with the
influx of people caused by growing industry and immigration (Kubrin, Thomas, and Krohn
2009).
Social disorganization theory developed in the United States during the first part of the
twentieth century, a period marked by rapid political, economic, and social change that affected
virtually all aspects of life (Kubrin, Thomas, and Krohn 2009). The theory emphasized
geographical distribution of crime and the structural characteristics of neighborhoods related to
this distribution (Warner and Pierce 1993). According to the theory, poverty, residential
mobility, ethnic heterogeneity and weak social networks decrease a neighborhoods capacity to
control the behavior of people in public, and hence increase the likelihood of crime (Kubrin and
Wietzer 2003).
The ecological approach to the study of crime fell out of vogue in the 1970’s, however,
and was replaced by more social-psychological theories (Warner and Pierce 1993). There were
several reasons for the decline of social disorganization theory. In his work, “Social
Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency”, Bursik (1988) identifies five central
criticisms that led to the dormancy of the social disorganization tradition: (1) the disciplinary
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shift in emphasis; (2) the assumption of stable ecological structures; (3) the measurement of
social disorganization; (4) the measurement of crime and delinquency; and (5) the normative
assumptions of social disorganization.
For the most part, early social disorganization studies assumed that social ties and social
control shaped neighborhood crime rates (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). It was not until the 1970’s
and 1980’s, however, that social disorganization was defined explicitly as the inability of a
community structure to realize the common values of its residents and to maintain effective
social controls (Bursik 1988). The major structural or community level concepts that impede
this process are residential stability or mobility, economic hardship (low socioeconomic status),
and racial/ethnic heterogeneity. Bursik and Grasmik (1993) argued that social disorganization
theory has focused on the capacity of local residents to regulate the behavior of their fellow
neighbors but neglected to examine the way “external considerations” impact upon local efforts
to enact community control.
Social disorganization theory began to pick up steam with the 1989 study by Robert J.
Sampson and W. Byron Groves. Their study was critical because it included indicators
reflecting how much social disorganization is actually occurring in a neighborhood (Kubrin,
Stucky, and Krohn 2009). They constructed community level measures of neighborhoods (e.g.
poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity) and hypothesized that communities with high rates of
participation in committees, clubs, local institutions and other organizations will have lower rates
of victimization and delinquency than in communities in which such participation is low
(Sampson and Groves 1989). The findings were largely supportive of social disorganization
theory: Communities characterized by strong social ties and informal social control had lower
rates of crime and delinquency and more importantly, these dimensions of social disorganization
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theory were found to explain, in large part, the effects of community structural characteristics
(e.g., poverty) on crime rates (Kubrin, Stucky, and Krohn 2009). More recently, family structure
or disruption and income inequality have been included in the social disorganization models
(Osgood and Chambers 2000).
2.2 Programmatic Interventions
2.2.1

Overview
There are a number of programmatic interventions that have been employed as a form of

either general or specific deterrence in the field of criminal justice. Programs like gun buy
backs, juvenile boot camps, juvenile awareness, Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E),
among others, have been implemented and used widely across the country as a means to control
criminal offending – or limit exposure to the social factors that lead to criminal offending.
Unfortunately, many of these programs have had limited success. For example, an analysis of
juvenile awareness programs has concluded that these programs do not have a significant effect
on deterring juvenile crime and in some instances may actually increase the likelihood of future
offending (Klenowski, Bell, and Dodson 2010). Additionally, a study on juvenile boot camps
conducted by Tyler, Darville, and Stalnaker (2001) concluded that juvenile boots camps are
ineffective in terms of costs and recidivism unless delinquents are giving the skills, motivation
and resources necessary to avoid the environment and lifestyle that contributed to the
delinquency in the first place. However, while quite a few programmatic interventions have
been shown to be ineffective in deterring criminal offending, a few have shown significant
success, particularly focused deterrence programs, which stem from problem-oriented policing.
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2.2.2

Problem-Oriented Policing
Until the late 1960’s, efforts to improve policing in this country concentrated almost

exclusively on internal management: streamlining the organization, upgrading personnel,
modernizing equipment, and establishing more businesslike operating procedures (Goldstein
1979). In the late 1970’s, researchers, police professionals, and policymakers became interested
in improving the effectiveness of policing (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing 2018). In
1979, Herman Goldstein introduced the idea of problem-oriented policing in his article entitled
Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. Goldstein argued that patrol officers
dominating objective was to respond quickly to calls for service, take appropriate actions,
complete necessary paperwork and wait for the next call for service, but he postulated that this
was an ineffective use of resources and that the police should group incidents around recurring
problems and focus on underlying causes (Alpert, Dunham and Stroshine 2015).
Problem-oriented policing provides an analytic framework (the scanning, analysis,
response, and assessment [SARA] model) used by police to identify and solve problems that
result in repeated calls for service (Reisig 2010). Goldstein’s original conception of problemoriented policing envisioned a sharp focus on specific substantive problems of some significance
(Cordner and Biebel 2005). Problems are defined either as collections of incidents related in
some way (if they occur at the same location, for example) or as underlying conditions that give
rise to incidents, crimes, disorder, and other substantive community issues that people expect the
police to handle (Cordner and Biebel 2005). The problem-solving approach permits the police to
discover lasting solutions to assist in the mobilization of public and private resources to attack
the identified problems (Alpert et al. 2015). Problem-oriented policing requires police agencies
to identify particular long-term community problems – street-level drug dealers, prostitution
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rings, gang hangouts – and develop strategies to eliminate them (Goldstein 1979). Problemoriented policing places a high value on new responses that are preventative in nature, that are
not dependent on the use of the criminal justice system, and that engage other public agencies,
the community and the private sector when their involvement has the potential for significantly
contributing to the reduction of the problem (Goldstein 2001).
One fundamental tenet of problem-oriented policing is that law enforcement, that is, the
use of criminal law as it relates to its consequences, should be understood as one means of
policing, rather than as the end or goal of policing (Cordner and Biebel 2005). In other words,
police practices were more focused on the “means” of policing rather than its “ends” (Goldstein
1979). Goldstein’s critique drew from a series of studies that had been recently completed which
suggested that such policing practices as “preventative patrol” (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and
Brown 1974) or “rapid patrol car response to calls for service” (Kansas City Police Department
1977) had little impact on crime (Wiesburd, Telep, Hinkle and Eck 2010).
2.2.3

Focused Deterrence
During the past two decades, criminologists have teamed up with police departments in

several U.S. cities to initiate and evaluate various forms of community and police interventions
for increasing both general and specific deterrence against crime (Land 2015). Focused
deterrence is rooted in problem-oriented policing framework (Corsaro and Engel 2015). Focused
deterrence policing efforts, consistent with problem-oriented policing framework, rely on datadriven intelligence gathering to identify carefully and target repeat, high-risk offenders (for
increased interagency law enforcement attention and individualized social service programming)
(Brunson 2015). Focused deterrence strategies are a relatively new addition to a growing
portfolio of evidence-based crime prevention practices available to policy makers and
28

practitioners (Braga and Weisburd 2014). Focused deterrence strategies are increasingly being
applied to prevent and control gang and group-involved violence, overt drug markets and
individual repeat offenders (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan 2018).
Focused deterrence is a crime reduction strategy in which carefully selected high-risk
offenders (prolific or particularly violent criminal offenders) receive concentrated social services
through direct, persuasive communication and rigorous follow-up of these commitments (Scott
2017). These strategies honor core deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by offenders,
while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law
enforcement tools to do so, such as directly communicating incentives and disincentives to
targeted offenders (Kennedy 1997, 2008).
2.2.4

Operation Ceasefire
The well-known Operation Ceasefire initiative was an interagency violence prevention

program that focused enforcement and social services resources on a small number of ganginvolved offenders at the heart of Boston’s youth violence problem (Kennedy, Piehl and Braga
1996). Originally launched as The Boston Gun Project, the initiative was developed in the mid1990’s as a problem-oriented policing intervention expressly aimed at reducing youth homicide
and youth firearms violence in Boston, Massachusetts. Led by the Boston Police Department, a
working group of law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and Harvard University
researchers diagnosed the youth violence problem in Boston as one of patterned, largely
vendetta-like (“beef”) hostility amongst a small population of chronic offenders, and particularly
among those involved in loose, informal, mostly neighborhood-based gangs (Braga, Hureau and
Papachristos 2014).
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The initiative represented an innovative partnership between academics and practitioners
(Appendix A) who worked together to diagnose the city’s youth homicide problem and to
develop and implement viable responses (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl and Waring, 2001). The
focused deterrence strategy behind Operation Ceasefire was designed to prevent violence by
reaching out directly to gangs, saying explicitly that violence would no longer be tolerated, and
backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when violence occurred
(Braga, Hureau and Papachristos 2014). The objective of the initiative was to get those who were
directly involved in gang activity to police themselves. The authorities could disrupt street
activity, focus police attention on low level street crimes such as trespassing and public drinking,
serve outstanding warrants, cultivate confidential informants for medium and long-term
investigations of gang activities, deliver strict probation and parole enforcement, seize drug
proceeds and other assets, ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request
stronger bail terms (and enforce them), and bring potentially severe federal investigative and
prosecutorial attention to gang-related drug and gun activity (Braga, Hureau and Papachristos
2014). Consequently, the chronic involvement of gang members in a wide variety of offenses
made them and their groups vulnerable to a coordinated criminal justice response.
The Ceasefire Working Group delivered an explicit message that violence was
unacceptable to the community and that “street” justifications for the violence were mistaken
(Braga, Hureau and Papachristos 2014). “Forums” or “call-ins” were held by the Ceasefire
Working Group to communicate clearly and directly the message and related consequences of
noncompliance (Kennedy, Piehl and Braga 1996). In addition to enforcement efforts, and in
keeping with its new neighborhood policing strategy, Boston employed numerous prevention and
intervention initiatives. Working with community partners, the city built on existing services in
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the communities to create a more extensive and effective continuum of services (National
Institute of Justice 2001). Concurrently, the “Streetworkers” (a coalition of Boston social service
workers), probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups offered
at-risk youth and/or gang members services and other types of assistance (National Institute of
Justice 2001).
The research suggested that the Boston Gun Project was a meaningful problem-oriented
policing effort that brought practitioners and researchers together in new ways and led both to a
fresh assessment of the youth violence problem in Boston and to operational activities that
departed substantially from previous practice. The principal intervention, Operation Ceasefire,
was likely responsible for a significant reduction in the city’s rates of youth homicide and gun
violence (Braga et al. 2001). Years later, a 2012 review of the existing research found that seven
of eight cities that had rigorously implemented Ceasefire and similar strategies had seen
reduction in violence (Beckett 2015) indicating that the program was successful.
The researcher acknowledges, however, that it is not possible to say with certainty what
caused the falloff in youth homicide in Boston or exactly what part Operation Ceasefire played
(Braga et al. 2001). “Because Ceasefire was conceived as an intervention aimed at interrupting
the overall dynamic of violence in which all Boston gangs and gang members were involved, the
operation could not be set up as a controlled experiment, with certain gangs or certain
neighborhoods excluded for purposes of comparison” (Kennedy et al 2001:43).
2.2.5

BRAVE
An example of a replicated version of Operation Ceasefire was the Baton Rouge Area

Violence Intervention (BRAVE) program. With strategic advising from the National Network,
the BRAVE program focused on one area of the city at a time to reduce violence, gun offenses
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and arrests while involving the community to help spread the “no violence” message (National
Network for Safe Communities 2018). According to BRAVE (2013), investigations and
statistics revealed that juvenile offenders between the ages of 12 – 24 were those who were most
likely to be the source of the violent crimes that were increasing in the Baton Rouge area.
BRAVE was one of the many projects initiated by law enforcement and other agencies to reduce
the violent crime rate committed by juveniles in parts of East Baton Rouge parish, particularly in
the 70805 and 70802 (Appendix B) zip codes.
According to the Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination Evaluation Report (2015), the
BRAVE objectives were as follows:
1. Change community norms toward group violence
a. Spread the “No Violence” message within the targeted community;
b. Develop a partnership between law enforcement, influential community members,
and social service providers to disseminate “the message” to violent groups,
chronic offenders, and individuals on probation/parole;
c. Use the community, law enforcement, faith-based organizations, and social
services partnership to inform specific members that continuing violence will not
be accepted, to promote the “No Violence” message, and to offer alternatives to a
criminal lifestyle;
d. Create anti-violence campaign using TV, radio, brochures, and various social
media.
2. Provide alternatives to group violence participants who opt out of violent behavior
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a. Establish a “one-stop shop” for rapid response to social needs, including
education, employment, mental health, and substance abuse treatment, anger
management, and others;
b. Provide case management services to assist with delivery, address barriers to
services, and track progress;
c. Provide supports and services to immediate family members who need assistance.
3. Alter the perception of youth regarding risks and sanctions associated with violent
offending through community policing, faith-based interventions and community services
a. Implement focused deterrence strategies using specific law enforcement efforts
and social networking to target offenders if violence continues;
b. Show violent group members and the community law enforcement will respond to
make examples out of those convicted, by imposing strict sanctions, and using
existing laws to make sanctions and sentences more severe.
2.2.6

Deterrence Theory
Deterrence is based on the psychological assumption that the subjective certainty and

unpleasantness of punishment discourages the community from engaging in criminal behavior
(Kennedy 1983). Deterrence is broken down into two distinct types: specific and general.
Specific and general deterrence involve possible behavioral responses (Nagin 2013). Specific
deterrence is designed – by the nature of the proscribed sanction – to deter only the individual
offender from committing that crime in the future (Onwudiwe, Odo and Onyeozili 2004).
General deterrence can be understood as the effect of detection and punishment of offenders on
those individuals who have not (yet) committed a crime, increasing their fear of detection and
punishment to deter them from committing a crime in the future (Schultz 2014). Much of the
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literature evaluating deterrence has been focused on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness
and severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of those crimes
(Paternoster 1987).
The deterrence theory of punishment can be traced to the early works of classical
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham (Onwudiwe et al
2004). These theorists saw three components to deterrence: celerity, certainty, and severity
(Williams and McShane 2004). Celerity is the speed with which a punishment is applied,
certainty is the concept of making a punishment sure to happen whenever an undesirable act is
committed and severity is the amount of pain to be inflicted on those who do harmful acts
(Williams and McShane 2004). In short, deterrence theorists believe that if punishment is
severe, certain and swift, a rational person will measure the gains and losses before engaging in
crime and will be deterred from violating the law if the loss is greater than the gain (Onwudiwe
et al 2004).
According to the deterrence theory, the rational calculus of the pain of legal punishment
offsets the motivation for the crime (presumed to be constant across offenders but not across
offenses), thereby deterring criminal activity (Akers 1990). In other words, deterrence theory
suggests that crimes can be prevented when the costs of committing the crime are perceived by
the offender to outweigh the benefits (Zimring and Hawkins 1973; Gibbs 1975). To prevent
crime, therefore, criminal law must emphasize penalties to encourage citizens to obey the law
(Onwudiwe et al 2004).
The deterrence doctrine, which was at the heart of classical criminology, arguably has
been the most researched topic in criminology since the later part of the 1960’s (Gibbs 1975) but
has undergone and important change in recent years with the addition of the concept and practice
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of “focused deterrence” (Hamilton, Rosenfeld and Levin 2018). Deterrence scholars discuss
how offenders are constantly revising their perceptions of the risks and rewards of criminal
behavior based on new information (McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson and Corsaro 2006).
2.3 Summary and Conclusion
One of the primary objectives of the criminal justice system is to find methods to deter
criminal offending. A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the growing evidence of
the effectiveness of the police deterrence strategies is the “focused deterrence” framework, often
referred to as “pulling levers policing” (Kennedy 1997, 2008). These focused deterrence, or
pulling levers policing strategies, targets specific offenses that are carried out by a very small
segment of the population who are susceptible to sanctions handed down by the criminal justice
system. There are five general phases in most focused deterrence initiatives: (1) program
planning and implementation; (2) high-risk offender selection; (3) high-risk offender
notification; (4) enforcement and secure delivery; and (5) follow-up communication (Scott
2017).
In recent years, scholars have begun to argue that police interventions provide an
effective approach for gaining deterrence against crime (Braga and Weisburd 2011). But what
happens when these interventions are no longer in place? Most research relating to focused
deterrence initiatives have concentrated on analyzing the pre- and post-intervention crime rates
in the designated areas (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl 2001; Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer
2010; Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, and Greenwood 2005; Braga, McDevitt and Pierce 2006; and Guin,
Barthelemy, Rizzuto, Thomas-Smith, Winchester, Maberry, Zhu, and Reed 2015). However,
neglected in this literature is ways in which jurisdictions can sustain these programs once the
initiatives are no longer being employed. As previously stated, the objectives of this research are
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to evaluate and analyze several focused deterrence initiatives and evaluate the crime rate data
one and two years after the end of the program’s enforcement. Using the data collected from the
focused deterrence initiative’s evaluations, I expect that there will be an increase in the violent
crime rate within the target areas once the focused deterrence initiatives are no longer being
enforced.
Extending this work further, this study will focus specifically on the Baton Rouge Area
Violence Elimination (BRAVE) program by conducting a comprehensive programmatic
evaluation of the initiative which will be gained through interviews with major stakeholders of
the program. Through these interviews, information and data on the effectiveness, fidelity and
successes of the program will be evaluated.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
As noted earlier, most evaluations of focused deterrence initiatives have relied only on
pre- and post-intervention crime rate data. These evaluations have not included crime rates
following the conclusion of the program that might give indication of the program’s
sustainability. This study relied on mixed methods research. Mixed methods research is defined
as an approach to research in which both quantitative and qualitative data are analyzed either
concurrently or in a sequence in which the combination of research methods is designed to
balance out the strengths and weaknesses of any one method to produce a richer set of evidence
to bring to bear on a research problem (Axinn and Pearce 2006).
Focused deterrence initiatives are aimed at influencing the criminal behavior of
individuals through the strategic application of enforcement and social service resources to
facilitate a desirable behavior (Braga et al 2018). There are three (3) types of focused deterrence
strategies: (1) Gang/group violence reduction – joins criminal justice agencies, social services
organizations and community members directly with violent groups to communicate credible
moral and law enforcement messages clearly while offering help (services and job opportunities)
to those who want it; (2) Drug market interventions – identifies street-level drug dealers,
immediately apprehends violent drug offenders and suspends criminal cases for non-violent
dealers while bringing together their families, law enforcement and criminal justice officials,
service providers and community leaders for a meeting that communicates directly to offenders
that drug dealing has to stop while offering help (services and job opportunities); and (3) HighRisk repeat offending individuals – address most dangerous offenders with wide range of legal
tools coupled with moral voices within the community communicating to the offender that
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violence is unacceptable while putting them on notice that their next offense will result in
extraordinary legal action (Braga et al 2018).
Several search strategies were employed to identify the focused deterrence initiatives that
will be used in this study. First, a keyword search 4 was performed in LSU Libraries online
databases 5. Second, a publication date range of 2000 – 2010 was applied to the search. From
this, approximately 3,000 relevant articles were located. Third, a review of the abstracts that
included focused deterrence initiatives and pulling lever strategies were completed. Finally,
forward searches were performed to locate the most important focused deterrence
studies/evaluations. For the purpose of this study, I used gang and group violence reduction
focused deterrence initiatives only. At the conclusion of the search, there were roughly twenty
(20) focused deterrence/pulling lever studies found. The search process began in July of 2018
and was completed in October of 2018.
The initiatives selected for this study were based on published evaluations that contained
pre- and post-intervention crime data. Additionally, the initiatives selected for this analysis were
chosen based upon the initiatives having the key elements of the focused deterrence strategy as
outlined by David M. Kennedy. As described by Kennedy (2006:156-157), pulling levers
operations tended to follow the basic framework:
1. Selections of a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or street drug dealing.

Keywords searched: focused deterrence, focused deterrence initiatives, pulling levers, pulling levers policing,
problem-oriented policing, focused deterrence initiatives and policing, pulling levers and policing, and focused
deterrence initiatives and gangs and group violence.
5
Databases searched: Sage Journals, JSTOR, Research Gate, Routledge and SoclIndex
4
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2. Pulling together an interagency enforcement group, typically including police, probation,
parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes federal enforcement agencies.
3. Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the field experience of front-line police
officers, to identify key offenders – and frequently groups of offenders, such as street
gangs, drug crews, and the like – and the context of their behavior.
4. Framing a special enforcement operation directed at those offenders and groups of
offenders, and designed to substantially influence that context, for example by using any
and all legal tools (or levers) to sanction groups such as crack crews whose members
commit serious violence.
5. Matching those enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the
moral voices of affected communities to those same offenders and groups.
6. Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let them know that
they are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as shooting) will get special attentions,
when that has in fact happened to particular offenders and groups, and what they can do
to avoid enforcement action. One form of this communication is the “forum”,
“notification”, or “call-in” in which offenders are invited or directed (usually because
they are on probation or parole) to attend face-to-face meetings with law enforcement
officials, service providers, and community figures.
To date, there have been many variations of the focused deterrence strategies that have
been modeled after the original Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts. While there are
many variations of the programs that have been implemented, many of the programs have
identical overlapping features that do not need to be highlighted individually. After completing
the searches and evaluating the initiatives, five (5) focused deterrence initiative programs have
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been selected to determine if there is a whiplash affect in the violent crime rates 6 that takes place
once the programs have ceased. Focused deterrence initiatives that were identified as being
eligible for this analysis are as follows:
1. Operation Ceasefire – Boston, MA (Braga et al. 2001)
2. Operation Ceasefire – Los Angeles, CA (Tita et al. 2005)
3. Project Safe Neighborhoods – Lowell, MA (Braga et al. 2006)
4. Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence – Cincinnati, OH (Engel, Tillyer and Corsaro
2010)
5. BRAVE – Baton Rouge, LA (Guin, Barthelemy, Rizzuto, Thomas-Smith, Winchester,
Mayberry and Zhu 2016).
The data employed for this portion of study will be retrieved from pre- and post-intervention
official crime data that has been collected from the evaluations of each of the focused deterrence
programs. Because each of the programs define violent crime in a different manner, for the
purpose of this study, I will be disaggregating the violent crime statistics to only include
homicides. Since the objective of this study is to determine if there is a whiplash effect in the
crime data following the conclusion of the programs, official homicide data will be collected
from the two years following the conclusion of each program and will be analyzed to determine
if there is a noteworthy increase in the crime rate in those areas.

For the purposes of the study, overall violent crime rates will be discussed in percentages. For each program,
overall violent crime rate variables may differ. The overall violent crime rate variables for each program is as
follows: (1) Operation Ceasefire (Boston) – youth homicide and youth gun violence; (2) Operation Ceasefire (Los
Angeles) – homicides, attempted homicides, robberies, assaults and kidnappings; (3) Project Safe Neighborhoods
(Lowell) – gun homicides and gun aggravated assaults; (4) Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence – homicides,
Group/Gang Member Involved (GMI) Homicides, Non-GMI homicides, violent firearms incidents and non-shooting
violent incidents; (5) Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination – Murder, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, and Illegal
Use of Weapons.
6
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Historically, crime data record keeping by jurisdictions across the United States was
virtually non-existent in the early years of the United States. Federal record keeping was
authorized in 1870 when Congress created the Department of Justice (Bartollas and Schmalleger
2014). Initially, the states and local police establishments largely ignored the task of record
keeping (either because of indifference or because of fear of federal control), but this tendency
began to reverse in the early part of the twentieth century when the International Chiefs of Police
formed a committee on Uniform Crime Reports (Bartollas and Schmalleger 2014).
Nationally, crime statistics come from three major data sources. The first is the Federal
Bureau of Investigations Uniform Crime Reporting program, which produces an annual
overview of major crime titled Crime in the United States (FBI 2017). The second major data
source is the National Incident-Based Reporting System, which is now being merged into the
UCR (Schmalleger 2017). Finally, the National Crime Victimization Survey of the Bureau of
Justice Statistics which is based on victim reports (Schmalleger 2017).
The information provided in crime statistics supplies interested parties with an overview
of criminal activity. Employed properly, the information that we gain can provide us with a
statistical picture of crime that can serve as a powerful tool for creating social policy. Decision
makers at all levels, including legislators, other elected officials, and administrators throughout
the criminal justice system, and rely on crime data to analyze and evaluate existing programs, to
fashion and design new crime control initiatives, to develop funding requests, and to plan new
laws and crime-control legislation (Schmalleger 2017).
The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program has been the starting place for law
enforcement executives, students of criminal justice, researchers, members of the media, and the
public at large seeking information on crime in the nation (FBI 2017). The program was
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conceived in 1929 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police to meet the need for
reliable uniform crime statistics for the nation. In 1930, the FBI was tasked with collecting,
publishing, and archiving those statistics. Every year since 1930, the Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) Section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been collecting and publishing
reports on the number of persons arrested by police agencies in the United States (Chilton and
Jarvis 1999). Research on crime trends most often relies on police-based data from the UCR and
the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR). One of the key reasons for this is that the UCR
and SHR can provide not only national data, but subnational information about crime as well.
The crime categories for this study are the UCR-defined Part I offenses, also knows at the index
crimes – and more colloquially referred to as “serious” crime. Part I offenses include both
crimes against persons (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and crimes against
property (burglary, larceny, auto theft and arson).
Data for the quantitative portion of the study was retrieved from the evaluation reports,
the individual jurisdictions 7 and/or the UCR – Part I offenses (violent crimes/crimes against
persons), specifically murder rates. Evaluation reports contained the pre- and post-intervention
crime data statistics, while statistics from the two years following the end of the focused
deterrence initiatives were retrieved from the individual jurisdictions and/or the UCR. Data was
analyzed using descriptive statistics which is the branch of statistics that describes, organizes,
and summarizes quantitative data in a clear and concise way either graphically or numerically
(Bell 2014). Graphs and charts have been included to present the data collected for this portion
of the study.

Statistical information from the individual jurisdiction may be retrieved from the police department websites,
public information officers, and/or city crime data websites.

7
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In the second portion of the analysis, I provide a critical and more in-depth programmatic
analysis of the BRAVE program, which has been identified as a focused deterrence or pulling
levers policing initiative. To do this, I interviewed eight (8) of the major stakeholders from the
original partnering organizations as listed in the Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination: Year 3
Evaluation Report (2016). Those partnering organizations include: the Office of the
Mayor/President, the District Attorney’s Office, the Baton Rouge Police Department, the East
Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, Louisiana State Police, the Department of Juvenile Services,
Louisiana State University Research Team, the BRAVE Office, Capital Area Human Services
District, the Dream Center and Hope Ministries. Background information for each of the major
stakeholders that have been interviewed can be found in Appendix C.
Prior to beginning the interview process, I submitted paperwork for approval from the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Louisiana State University to ensure that this study
complied with all research regulations as they relate to human subjects (Appendix D).
Vulnerable populations were not interviewed at any time during this study. After receiving IRB
approval, the interviews took place in February and March of 2019. Face-to-face interviews
were conducted with each of the major stakeholders. Major stakeholders were interviewed
individually at a location of their choosing. In the event that an interviewee could not meet with
me face-to-face, then the interview was conducted either via telephone or electronic mail (email). Prior to beginning the interview, the major stakeholders were asked to sign a consent
form (see Appendix E). Additionally, I requested permission to take notes as well as audio
record the interview for transcription purposes. For interviewees who could only complete the
interview via electronic mail or via telephone, consent was waived, but the stakeholders granted
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me permission to use the information they provided in the study. Interviews lasted anywhere
from approximately 30 to 60 minutes.
Data for the qualitative section of the study was retrieved from the answers to the
interview questions. The interview consisted of both closed and open-ended questions. There
was one (1) closed-ended interview question which was designed in an introductory format to
elicit specific information about the interviewer such as their job title and their role in the
BRAVE program. Key questions and closing interview questions were open-ended. This
research method is useful for collecting data that reveal the values, perspectives, experiences and
worldviews of the respondent (Crossman 2018). A semi-structured format was used for the
interviews (see Appendix F). A list of questions was developed and used as a guide while also
allowing for deviation on the part of the respondent and/or follow-up questions from the
interviewer.
While I attentively listened, took detailed notes and guided the interview process, the
complete interview with the major stakeholders were recorded using a digital audio recording
device and/or FreeConferenceCall.com recording service. This service allowed the interviewer
to record audio, access, playback, download and share the audio recording, if necessary. Once
each interview was completed, a copy of the audio was then uploaded into Otter.ai, a program
that was utilized to transcribe the audio recordings.
The data for this study was analyzed in three different stages. First, I began by reading
over the transcribed interviews from the transcription service and verified the interviews against
the recordings. Second, I read over the transcripts and coded them by patterns and themes that
emerged throughout the interviews. Third, data triangulation was used in this study. Data
triangulation involves using different sources of information in order to increase validity of the
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study (Guion, Diehl and McDonald 2012). Sources can be stakeholders in a program, like
BRAVE, that include, but are not limited to members of the law enforcement, the District
Attorney’s Office, faith-based organizations, and community members. Feedback from the
stakeholder groups will be compared to determine areas of agreement as well as areas of
divergence (Guion et al. 2012).
Through interviews with the various parties, I obtained feedback on what role they played
in the program, what – if any – issues they encountered and what they felt were any impediments
to the success of the program. Ultimately, through analysis, I was able to measure the
effectiveness of the program, understand where the successes were and outline the programmatic
fidelity which is the degree to which program providers deliver the program as intended
(Dusenbury, Brannigan, Falco and Hansen 2003), that includes a number of dimensions,
including adherence, dose, quality, participant responsiveness, and program differentiation (Dane
and Schneider 1998).
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Chapter 4. Analysis
The quantitative portion of the study reviewed the pre-and post-intervention data as
reported in the respective program evaluations. As previously stated, the focused deterrence
initiatives that were identified as being eligible for this analysis are: Operation Ceasefire –
Boston, MA (Braga et al. 2001); Operation Ceasefire – Los Angeles, CA (Tita et al. 2005);
Project Safe Neighborhoods – Lowell, MA (Braga et al. 2006); Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce
Violence – Cincinnati, OH (Engel, Tillyer and Corsaro 2010); and BRAVE – Baton Rouge, LA
(Guin, Barthelemy, Rizzuto, Thomas-Smith, Winchester, Mayberry and Zhu 2016). Each of
these programs were employed as focused deterrence initiatives with various key components
that were implemented into the different programs based on need in the target areas (Table 1).
Each initiative worked to combat various forms of violent crime in their respective target
areas. In Boston, there was a 63% decline in youth gang violence during Operation Ceasefire.
From 1996 – 2000, there were continued decreases in violent crime in the target areas.
Operation Ceasefire – Los Angeles, successfully completed in 2000, saw some reductions in
gang related crime and violent crime. Project Safe Neighborhoods – Lowell saw a 24% reduction
in gun assaults and 50% reduction in gun homicides while the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce
Violence saw an almost immediate impact of 61% reductions in homicides involving high risk
offenders. The Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination program saw a considerable decrease in
violent crime, as well, particularly during the first two years after implementation of the
initiative. Overall, statistics from each of the focused deterrence initiatives indicate that the
violent crime incidences in each of the target areas throughout the various jurisdictions showed
various levels of decline from slight to significant, particularly at the outset of the programs.
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Table 1. Key Components of Focused Deterrence Initiatives

Component
Law Enforcement Driven

Operation Ceasefire
(Boston, MA)

Operation Ceasefire
(Los Angeles, CA)

Project Safe
Neighborhoods
(Lowell, MA)

X

X

X

Cincinnati Initiative
to Reduce Violence
(Cincinnati, OH)

Public Health Driven

Baton Rouge Area
Violence Elimination
(Baton Rouge, LA)

X

Focused Deterrence

X

X

X

X

X

Pulling Levers Approach

X

X

X

X

X

Linkage to Services

X

X

X

X

X

Violence Interrupters

X

Data Driven

X

X

X

X

X

Partnerships

X

X

X

X

X

Communication Strategy

X

X

X

X

Community Wide Intervention
Use of Outreach Workers

X

X

X

X

Local Organization Driven

X
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X

Operation Ceasefire – Boston, MA
The city of Boston, Massachusetts has a geographic area of approximately 48 square
miles. According to the 2000 United States Census Bureau, Boston had a total population of
589,141. Of that number, 113,715 are between the ages of 15 – 24. The racial breakdown of the
residents of Boston is as follows: White – 54.5%; Black – 25.3%; Hispanic or Latino – 14.4%;
and other race – 5.8%. There were 239,528 households in Boston with 48.1% of them being
family households and 51.9% of them being nonfamily households. Of the 48.1% family
households, 16.4% are female headed households. Educationally, 34% of Boston’s residents
from the ages of 18 – 24 hold a high school diploma, general equivalency degree or less while
45% of the residents 25 and older have the same educational attainment status. The median
annual income in Boston in 2000 was $39,629. Relative to many urban areas, 15.3% of family
households live below the poverty line and while 29% of female headed households live below
the poverty line.
Originally known as the Boston Gun Project, Operation Ceasefire was implemented as a
problem-oriented policing initiative aimed at reducing youth homicides. The Boston area
working group began meeting to figure out ways to combat the gun and youth violence problem
in 1995. The working group had all the components of the intervention in place and began street
operations in early 1996. For purposes of analysis, the implementation date used is May 15,
1996. On this day, the first call-in for Operation Ceasefire occurred with all of the elements of
the focused deterrence strategy in place. The youth homicide impact evaluation for Operation
Ceasefire focused on victims under the age of 24. The youth homicide impact evaluation
examined the monthly counts of youth homicides in Boston between January 1, 1991 and May
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31, 1998; the pre-intervention period included the relatively stable, but historically high post
epidemic years of 1991 – 1995 (Braga et al 2001).
For the purpose of this study, I will look at the youth homicide numbers as reported
yearly. In the five-year pre-intervention period of 1991 - 1995, youth homicides fluctuated
between 37 and 48. Statistically, there was an average of approximately 44 youth homicides per
year after a significant spike of 73 youth homicides in 1990 (Figure 5). Analyzing the postintervention youth homicides numbers in the city of Boston, the average number of yearly youth
homicides dropped by 42 percent from 1996 – 1997. In 1998, the youth homicide number
increased slightly to 18 accounting for a 12 percent increase from the first call-in.
The evaluation period for Operation Ceasefire ended on May 31, 1998. Examining the
two years following the culmination of the program, the youth homicide rate continued to
decline (Figure 6). The number of youth homicides logged in 1999 was 15 8. This was a 16.67
percent decrease from 1998. In 2000, the number of youth homicides began to increase slightly
up to 188 for that year. When analyzing the data for the post-intervention period, the number of
homicides appeared to vacillate back and forth. The most significant decrease occurred from
1996 to 1997 when the youth homicide rate decreased by 42 percent.

Braga, Anthony. 2003. “Serious Youth Gun Offenders and the Epidemic of Youth Violence in Boston.” Journal of
Qualitative Criminology 19(1):33-54.

8

49

Figure 5. Pre-Intervention through Post-Intervention Period - Boston

50

Figure 6. Post-Intervention Period - Boston
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Operation Ceasefire – Los Angeles, CA
Los Angeles had a different set of issues as compared to Boston. The cities are different
geographically, politically, and racially. The city of Los Angeles has a geographic area of 469
square miles, which is more than 400 square miles larger than Boston. According to the 2000
United States Census Bureau, Los Angeles had a total population of 3,694,820 – almost six times
the size of Boston. Additionally, Operation Ceasefire in Boston was geared toward African
American gangs while the city of Los Angeles was quickly becoming predominately Latino.
Because of these distinct differences, implementing a Ceasefire style initiative in the city of Los
Angeles appeared to be logistically impossible. This caused the working group angst when
trying to determine where best implement the Ceasefire style initiative.
The initial working group, which consisted of six individuals: one (1) from RAND
Corporation which is a nonprofit that assists with policy and decision making through research
and analysis (Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, Grammich, Abrahamse and Greenwood 2010); and the
other five (5) from various criminal justices agencies in early 1999, began identifying individuals
and partners who would be most helpful in implementing the project. Once the working group
came together and the group began analyzing and examining violent crime data, they homed in
on the area known as Hollenbeck. Many of the oldest gangs in the city of Los Angeles are in the
Hollenbeck area. Hollenbeck, a 15 square mile area east of downtown Los Angeles with a
population of approximately 206,000 in 2000, was chosen as the replication area for Ceasefire
Los Angeles (Appendix G). The Hollenbeck area consisted of the communities of El Sereno,
Lincoln Heights and Boyle Heights. Eighty-one percent of the people who reside in the
Hollenbeck area are Latino, primarily of Mexican Heritage. The median annual income in the
Hollenbeck area was $36,560. Educationally, only 6.6% of Hollenbeck’s residents have a
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bachelor’s degree or higher and comparatively to many urban areas, 41% of the households are
headed by females.
As the working group met in early October 2000 to discuss their implementation strategy,
disagreements between service providers and law enforcement were highlighted. Service
providers encouraged immediate law enforcement implementation due to escalating violence. As
the intervention was awaiting final review from law enforcement:
On October 8, 2000, a particularly brazen “walk-by” shooting took place in the
Hollenbeck area of the city of Los Angeles. According to police, several members of the
Cuatro Flats gang, armed with handguns and at least one high-powered semi-automatic
assault weapon, climbed out of a van and opened fire on a group of rival gang members –
TMC (The Mob Crew). They left one TMC member dead, along with a 10-year old girl
who was riding a scooter nearby. The double homicide, in an area notorious for its gun
crime and predatory killings, set in motion an intervention that came to be known as
Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles.
Tita, Riley, Ridgeway and Greenwood 2005

This event was considered the triggering event for Operation Ceasefire Los
Angeles. The pre-intervention period was the six months prior to the triggering event and
the post-intervention period lasted four months. In this initiative, the deterrence period
was determined to be the two months following the post intervention period. The number
of violent crimes 9 in the six months before the intervention was 918 (Table 2). The
number of violent crimes in the six months after the October 8, 2000 intervention date
was 663. During the post-intervention phase and the deterrence period, the violent crime
rate decreased by 28%.

9

Violent crimes – number of homicides, attempted homicides, robberies, assaults and kidnappings
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Table 2. Violent Crime Numbers: Hollenbeck
Six Month PreIntervention Period

Four Month Post-Intervention
Period + 2 Month Deterrence
Period

Percent
Change

918

663

-28%

Disaggregating the violent crime numbers and focusing only on homicides by the year,
there was a significant increase in the number of homicides in the Hollenbeck area after the
implementation of Operation Ceasefire. In 1999, the year prior to the implementation of the
initiative, there were 35 homicides in the Hollenbeck area. Homicides fell by 4 to 31 in 2000, the
year of implementation. In 2001, the number of homicides creeped up to 38 and in 2002 to 49.
When looking at the disaggregated yearly homicide rate for Hollenbeck, focusing only on
homicides, homicides increased by 38% in the two years following implementation (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Yearly Homicide Rates - Hollenbeck

Project Safe Neighborhoods – Lowell, MA
Project Safe Neighborhoods (Lowell) program was organized as an integrated academicpractitioner partnership more closely resembling a policy analysis exercise that blends research,
policy design, action and evaluation (Kennedy and Moore 1995). Based on Operation Ceasefire,
the Project Safe Neighborhoods working group and Lowell Police Department set up a
partnership with several community-based organizations and social service workers in an effort
to combat violent gun crime.
The city of Lowell, Massachusetts has a geographic area of nearly 15 square miles.
According to the 2000 United States Census Bureau, Lowell had a total population of 105,167.
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Of that number, 17,003 are between the ages of 15 – 24. The racial breakdown of the residents
of Boston is as follows: White – 62.5%; Black – 3.5%; Asian – 17%; Hispanic or Latino – 14%;
and other race – 3%. There were 37,887 households in Lowell with 63.3% of them being family
households and 36.7% of them being nonfamily households. Of the 63.3% family households,
nearly 17% are female headed households. Approximately 55% of Lowell’s residents between
the ages of 18 – 24 hold at least a high school diploma and/or a general equivalency degree or
less while 61% of the residents 25 and older have the same educational attainment status. The
median annual income in Boston in 2000 was $39,192. Finally, roughly 14% of family
households live below the poverty line and while 32% of female headed households live below
the poverty line.
Unlike other major cities, Lowell did not have a particularly high homicide rate as there
were only two homicides recorded in 2000 and 2001. However, by the end of 2002, there were
six recorded homicides in the city which represented a 67 percent increase. In addition to
homicides, the number of gun aggravated assaults began to increase significantly during this time
as well.
In creating an intervention that would be as effective as Boston’s Ceasefire, the Lowell
working group ran into an issue while attempting to create a viable plan. While there were
Hispanic gangs who were being targeted, there was also a growing number of Asian gangs.
Many of the members of the Asian gangs (and growing Asian community) were from the
Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (McDevitt, Braga, and Cronin 2007).
This created difficulty in implementing an intervention due to cultural and communication
barriers. Similar to other minority communities, these Asian communities had a distrust of
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police, fear of retaliation from gang members and an overall reluctance to participate violence
reduction programs due to skepticism.
Many of the homicides and violent crime in Lowell were committed by young, minority
males who were members of gangs/groups that tended to be loosely organized. Another added
layer to the violent crime in Lowell was the discovery that older members of the community
were complicit in illegal activities with the young gang members. In most cities where gangs are
prevalent, there is generally an added drug marketing element. However, in Lowell, there was a
gambling component. Older members of the Asian community, who were mostly business
owners, used their businesses as a front for gambling operations while consorting with gang
members who were used to protect their businesses and collect on any unpaid debts.
Once the working group was able to disentangle the web of illegal activities that were
taking place in the city and convince members of the community to buy into the intervention
program through community meetings and a communications campaign, Project Safe
Neighborhoods – Lowell was ready to be implemented. October 2002 was selected as the official
implementation date for the PSN intervention. During the implementation period, raids and
arrests for gambling and all other crimes were carried out with the goal of sending a clear
message to Asian gangs to stop all violence.
Given that Lowell had very few homicides prior to implementation, gun homicides and
gun assaults were aggregated for this intervention since the Lowell area was experiencing a
slight increase in homicides and an even more significant increase in assaults with firearms. For
purpose of this study, I will disaggregate the numbers to only include homicides. Analyzing
homicide data for the five-year pre-intervention period, the average number of homicides for the
years 1997 through 2001 was 4.8. In the post-intervention period of the study, the number of
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homicides fluctuated (Figure 8). In 2002, the year of implementation there were seven
homicides. In 2003, that number dropped to two which accounted for a 71% decrease. The
following year, homicides crept back up to five for a 60% overall increase and then fell
significantly again in 2005 another 60%. The most considerable increase in homicides occurred
in 2006 with 13 – an 84% jump. According to the case study on PSN - Lowell, determining the
end of the initiative was slightly complicated because as of February 2007, the intervention
(executing search warrants for gambling houses when Asian youth gangs engaged in violence)
had not been formally disbanded, but there were suggestions through interviews that the
intervention had tapered off (McDevitt, Braga and Cronin 2007). Because of the uncertainty, for
the purposes of this study, I used January 2007 as the end date of the program. In that year, the
number of homicides dropped considerably to three and rose again by 50% in 2008.
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Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence – Cincinnati, OH
The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence was a focused deterrence initiative that
mimicked Operation Ceasefire – Boston. The initiative involved direct communication of
consequences for violence to at-risk gang members. As with other cities where focused
deterrence initiatives were implemented, Cincinnati began experiencing an increased number of
homicides in 1998 with numbers peaking at an all-time high of 89 homicides in 2006.
The city of Cincinnati, Ohio has a geographic area of approximately 77 square miles.
According to the 2010 United States Census Bureau, the city of Cincinnati had a total population
of 296,943. The number of youths between the ages of 15 – 24 that reside in the city of
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Cincinnati is 53,271. The racial breakdown of the residents in the city of Cincinnati is as
follows: White – 49.3%; Black – 44.8%; Hispanic or Latino – 2.8%; Asian – 1.8%; and other
race – 1.3%. In 2010, there were 133,420 households in Cincinnati with 46.7% of them being
family households and 53.3% of them being nonfamily households. Of the 46.7% family
households, 19.1% are female headed households. Almost 42% of individuals between the ages
of 18 – 24 hold a high school diploma and/or general equivalency degree or less while 38.5% of
the residents 25 and older have the same educational attainment status. The median annual
income in Cincinnati in 2010 was $33,681. Relative to many urban areas, 22% of family
households live below the poverty line and while 44.5% of female headed households live below
the poverty line.
In April 2007, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), a multi-agency and
community collaborative effort was implemented and designed to quickly and markedly reduce
gun violence and associated homicides with the intent of having sustained reductions over time
(Engel, Tillyer and Corsaro 2013). The CIRV program was headed by local politicians who were
responsible for the program and branching off into two co-chairs, who were the strategy team
that were responsible for developing and deploying the strategy, obtaining resources and
monitoring results and rounding out the working group with four separate strategy teams who
were responsible for law enforcement duties, services, community engagement and systems.
The pre-intervention period for CIRV was the three years prior to full implementation
which occurred in July 2007 with the first call in. The post-intervention period for the CIRV
program ran through 2013 which includes the two-year post-intervention period of 2011 – 2013
for this program. As previously stated, leading up to the implementation of CIRV, the number of
homicides in the city of Cincinnati jumped from 64 to 89 which was an increase of 28% (Figure
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9). With the implementation of CIRV and utilizing the pulling levers strategy, the postintervention period began with the number of homicides in 2007 dropping 22% to 69. There was
a slight uptick in 2008 followed by a significant drop of 21% in 2009. To round out the postintervention period, homicides increased by 11% to 71. During the post-intervention period of
2011 and 2012, homicides dropped by 25%, but in 2013 there was a significant increase of 28%
with homicides spiking from 53 to 74.
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Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination – Baton Rouge, LA
The Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination (BRAVE) program was modeled and
implemented after Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. It was a focused deterrence strategy that was
designed to address increased levels of violent crime 10, particularly committed by juveniles
between the ages of 12 – 24, in targeted parts of East Baton Rouge Parish. The
mayor/president’s office was the fiscal agent and lead administrator of the program while the
district attorney’s office and a representative from the Baton Rouge Police Department’s newly
created BRAVE office were responsible for day to day operations. Members of the working
group included representatives of area law enforcement agencies, social services, faith-based
community members and Louisiana State University academic research team (Appendix H).
Baton Rouge, Louisiana encompasses a geographic expanse of 75 square miles and
according to the 2010 United States Census Bureau, had a total population of 229,493. Of that
number, 48,633 are between the ages of 15 – 24. The racial breakdown of the residents of Baton
Rouge is as follows: Black – 50.4%; White – 40.8%; Hispanic or Latino – 3.5%; and other race –
5.3%. There were 91,474 households in the city of Baton Rouge with 56.2% of them being
family households and 43.8% of them being nonfamily households. Residing in the city of Baton
Rouge, approximately 20% of the households are female headed households. Educationally,
roughly 21% of Baton Rouge’s residents from the ages of 18 – 24 hold a high school diploma,
general equivalency degree while 13% have not completed high school. Of the residents in the
city who are 25 years and older, almost 26% have a high school diploma or GED while 15.7%
have never completed high school. The median annual income in Baton Rouge in 2010 was

10

Violent crime – Homicides, Robberies, Aggravated Assaults and other firearm crime
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$36,964. Relative to many urban areas, about 18.1% of all family households live below the
poverty line and while 37.6% of female headed households live below the poverty line.
A working group was established in 2012 to address violent crime in the city of Baton
Rouge. After an increase in population between 2005 – 2010, primarily from displaced residents
from Hurricane Katrina, and persistent poverty in certain areas of the city, by 2011 there was a
dramatic increase in homicides which was nearly 25 times higher than the national average.
Based on the Group Violence Reduction Strategy (now called Group Violence Intervention), the
city of Baton Rouge developed the BRAVE model with the intent of combatting serious violent
crime including homicides. Full implantation of this focused deterrence, pulling levers initiative
was fully implemented in 2013 which began the post-intervention period. The BRAVE program
ended in early 2017. I will look at homicides rates for 2017 and 2018 for the post-intervention
period.
Homicide rates for the BRAVE target areas were not available for 2010 and 2011 and
city homicides were not reported in 2010. The first call-ins were held in 2013. In 2013, the
BRAVE target areas reported a 50% decrease in homicides in 70802 and a slight increase of 5%
increase in 70805 (Figure 10). The following year saw a 29% decrease in 70805 and a
significant spike of 47% in 70802. There was an increase of 2 homicides a year in 2015 and
2016 in 70805 and another 50% drop in 70802. In 2017, the number of homicides in 70805 and
70802 increased dramatically. In 70805, the number of homicides rose by 33% and in 70802 by
almost 57%. Comparatively, in the city of Baton Rouge from 2016 to 2017, the number of
homicides increased by 40 accounting for 46% increase in homicides (Figure 11). A
comparative table of homicides for 70802, 70805, and the City of Baton Rouge has been
included for clarity (Table 3).
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23
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87
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22
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Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination Program Analysis
The purpose of the qualitative portion of the project was to conduct a programmatic
evaluation of the Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination (BRAVE) program. Here, I will
discuss the feedback that was given from the respondents on the role they played in the BRAVE
program, what issues they encountered and what they felt were any impediments to the success
of the of the program. Through analysis, I was able to examine the effectiveness of the program,
see where the successes were based on the experiences of the respondents and examine the
programmatic fidelity to the program. From the analysis, there were three major themes that
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emerged within the data. Those themes were: (1) Program Structure; (2) Transportation; and (3)
Major events that affected sustainability.
Program Structure
The fiscal lead of BRAVE program was the Mayor/President’s Office in East Baton
Rouge Parish. Administrative partners responsible for the implementation of the program were
representatives from the Baton Rouge Police Department, East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office,
East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney’s Office and other law enforcement agencies. Along
with representatives from those stakeholder organizations, representatives from the faith-based
community and social service providers as well as academics from Louisiana State University
were supporting members of the working group. In speaking with the respondents, two distinct
issues in reference to program structure stood out: law enforcement vs. resource providers and
the role of resource providers.
Law Enforcement vs. Resource Providers
Upon implementation, BRAVE was greeted with heavy skepticism in the 70805-zip
code, even though every effort was made to introduce the program as a way to reduce violence in
the community (Appendix I). As per the Group Violence Reduction Strategy, violent crime can
be dramatically reduced when law enforcement, community members, and social providers join
together to directly engage with violent street groups and gangs to clearly communicate: (1) a
law enforcement message that any future violence will be met with clear, predictable and certain
consequences; (2) a moral message against violence by community representatives; and (3) a
genuine offer of help for those who want it (Von Ulmenstein and Sultan 2015). Upon rollout of
the BRAVE program, there appeared to be some confusion as to which entities would take the
lead role and the perception that leadership role displayed within the community.
67

Some of the members of the BRAVE Team were law enforcement officers. Additionally,
in their capacity on the BRAVE Team, these law enforcement officers were also tasked with
getting the program participants and community residents to buy in to the program by convincing
them to accept the help and take part in the social services and various programs that were being
offered. According to BRAVE Project Representative A, it was initially very difficult for
residents in the community and the program participants to separate the law enforcement officer
role from the BRAVE role. As evident in many minority communities across the country, there
is a deep disdain for law enforcement because citizens do not feel as though they can be trusted.
In many instances, law enforcement officers are not familiar with the community that they are
tasked to serve and that creates additional tension when trying to implement a program like
BRAVE. During the advertisement of the BRAVE program one respondent commented, “All
you saw was a group of police in front of the camera. I think that was a distraction…and a
detractor.”
Consistent with that assumption, BRAVE Project Representative A shared that there were
community meetings that were held and conducted by the Louisiana State University Academic
partners prior to implementation to survey community perceptions of law enforcement, and the
results were less than stellar. According to BRAVE Project Representative A:
“I failed to mention that we conducted a survey just to see what the community
perception was about law enforcement before we began the implementation and the
grant…and that survey - that survey’s results were horrible. The community felt as
though the police were not responding to their needs to be just blunt. It said that…they
said that we as law enforcement officers, police differently in minority - predominantly
minority - neighborhoods, as opposed to other neighborhoods. So, they felt as though that
they were being abandoned and mistreated. And we had a lot of work to do to be able to
gain their trust. So, that's what the initial survey had said…we were able to measure some
of the community's perception because we conducted other surveys at other community
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meetings. We had community meetings once a month to try to hear their concerns and
address their concerns.”

While the working group was hopeful that the community would recognize that all
parties involved wanted to provide future participants with services to assist, the ultimate goal of
the initiative was to reduce violent crime by pulling all levers, if necessary. During the call-ins,
the stakeholder organizations relayed a very clear message to participants that continued violence
would not be tolerated. The intent was that those who had attended would go back and relay this
very important message to other group members. Those who attended, as well as those who the
message was translated to, had three choices: (1) to stop the violence and take advantage of the
help (social service/resource providers) offered; (2) just stop the violence; and (3) know that if
you continue any violent activities, all levers would be pulled to ensure that you were prosecuted
to the fullest extent of the law. Because of the skepticism, many of those who attended the callins did not take advantage of the help nor did they relay the message to others. Consequently,
the “help/assistance” component of the message was not communicated to possible recipients of
the program or residents within the community. When speaking with BRAVE Project
Representative B, there was also a shared similar sentiment as it related to the community
reception of the BRAVE program.
“So, when those individuals don't participate and they don't come in and they continue to
do their “activity”, well now the law enforcement side came in. Well, the program itself,
which was a combined effort of major stakeholders (law enforcement/social
services/faith-based), you know, wasn’t presented to the community as a program that
was intended to help. [It looked more like a law enforcement initiative with the intent to
only lock people up.] So, that's where the name the “BRAVE Team” came from. The
street labeled that group of law enforcement because, you know, you had a certain group
come (that task force that I spoke of) to go out and you know, for those that had warrants
and things like that, they [BRAVE Team] would get together and they will pick up those
individuals. Well, that's what the community saw. That's what people saw. So, when you
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spoke of BRAVE, they immediately connected BRAVE with the law enforcement piece.
So, the law enforcement piece some kind of way was driven more into the community
than the actual program piece because the only people, I guess, who really heard of the
program side were those that were probably at the call in. So if I'm not a problem person,
I don't have a problem child, I may have seen a glimpse of it on the news, but to really
know about the program - I don't really know about the program – but, I'm constantly
seeing these white Chargers riding around and you know these arrests are being
made…Now, did it play a vital role? Yes, it did. Did it help in the decrease in the
violence? Yes, it did. It really did. And it was absolutely needed, but it (law
enforcement) also got put before the program (social service/resource providers)…before
anybody knew what the program (social service/resource provider) was.
From the resource provider’s perspective, they also felt that the community was not truly
receptive to the program initially a few reasons. First, because the community had the perception
that the BRAVE program was law enforcement driven and second, because there had been so
many other programs that were presented to the community that had come and gone with no
positive results. A participating representative from a faith-based agency discussed the
community’s receptiveness like this:
“So, at first it [reception to the program] was very pessimistic, like ‘Uh, it’s another
program; what are y’all going to do now? Do y’all realize we had a lot of community
meetings and tried to really build the community support?’ So, you definitely had to
combat that. It’s another program…so many programs have come in and out of this area.
Nothing’s changed and so that was definitely something that we had to deal with from the
onset.”
Eventually, as time went on, members of the community began to become more receptive
and less skeptical of the program. According to a member of the LSU Academic Research Team,
the community members began to see them there [in the community] week after week talking to
the kids, people were at the schools or conducting community events with law
enforcement…canvasing the community to let them know that major stakeholders were there if
they (the community residents) needed help. As the community began to see the representatives
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from the District Attorney’s office, the Baton Rouge Police Department, the East Baton Rouge
Parish Sheriff’s Office along with the faith-based community as well as other members of the
working group, they began to let their guards down. They held programs like Gas for Guns,
neighborhood clean ups, back to school events, community canvasses where members of the
community got a chance to dialogue with members of the major stakeholders in a family-friendly
atmosphere.
Resource Providers vs. Resource Providers
In the initial planning phase of focused deterrence initiatives, it is important to have the
right structure. It is equally as important to ensure that you have the right individuals
participating in the working group. As stated previously, the BRAVE program followed a threepronged approach. There was the faith-based component, the law enforcement component and
the social services component.
The BRAVE program came to fruition through a federal grant sponsored in part by the
Department of Justice – Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The grant
funded the program with $3 million dollars over the course of three years. During the initial
planning phase, individuals, groups, community leaders and other stakeholders were sought out
to participate in the BRAVE program based on the implementation target area. In other words,
because the BRAVE program was a federally funded program, one component of the federal
guidelines was that the major stakeholders had to be located within the 70805-zip code.
The initial grant, which was originally written up in 2012, was denied. Per a
representative from the LSU Academic Research team:
“The first grant…when the first grant was not funded…so, we had a mayor's office, who
convened a number of people to do the planning for the first grant…and so these people
all came together and worked for two weeks to help us get the grant done, because it was
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a big collaboration of things. I mean, one, like I couldn't go to LSU, sit down, and write
the grant…you had to have all these other entities involved. And so, once that was not
funded, you know, people that seem to be only interested in the money dropped off, but
anyway, you know, there were the diehards, like representatives from Juvenile Court.”
So, ultimately, a few of the stakeholders that were included in the original grant were not
included in the writing of the second grant because when the original grant was not approved,
some individuals became disillusioned with the program. Included in the writing of the second
grant were individuals who were committed to the program which included many of the faithbased and service providers in the community. Unfortunately, some of the faith-based
organizations were not written into the grant to receive funding but had been solicited to
participate on the front end. According to one member of the faith-based community:
“…the partners who signed in, such as myself, we did not get involved besides like the
call-ins where you have a little something to say. But as the stakeholders that live in the
community, we were supposed to be a part of the interaction with these young people. So
we used our facilities, people who already volunteered in the community, our programs
we already were using to supplement what was happening in BRAVE to sort of steer
these young people to a better life…umm, in the community itself, the original residents,
even though we did have people who had entities, like a sub-plant over here [in 70805] or
an auxiliary ministry or organization but a lot of the original stakeholders, African
American led organizations [were not written into the grant]…my disappointment was
that our involvement in really the face to face and us being the ones who mentor, disciple,
instruct them [program participants] – our participation was little to none.”

There appeared to be a point of contention as to which of the stakeholders within the community
were going to be compensated for their participation and therefore would have the most
involvement in the program. According to a representative from another faith-based
organization, which served as an intake facility for individuals who chose to opt out of crime,
had this to say:
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“I will say from our perspective, we as a church…as considered a white church, received
a lot of flak initially about “why were you given this program instead of another faithbased organization in the community?” And so one of the things that we had to combat
with that is it wasn't so much about white or black, it was about we had been doing these
other programs [other community initiatives] and we had the documentation to support
[the other initiatives] what we were doing and so helping them [black churches]
understand that you're doing great things, we just got to get you to document that so you
can come on board and be a partner, too. Like it takes the whole community. It's not
about, oh, “them” or “they” or “they're going to do it”. No, it takes all of us, but your
efforts have to be documented. So, helping them [black churches] understand that was
the reason and [also] the fact that we were [already] planted here in 70805…as an
outreach center…as part of the community and so kind of helping them understand
that…”
Ultimately, according to the LSU Academic Research Team representative, service
providers and faith-based organizations could not be “just written” into the grant without proper
vetting. There were federal guidelines that had to be followed in order to ensure that the grant
would be approved. In this case, each entity had to submit a Request for Proposal (RFP) and
have sufficient supporting documentation in order to be selected in the distribution of funds.
Transportation
In speaking with all of the respondents, at least half of them noted that one of the main
challenges during the program was ensuring that participants had transportation to all of their
appointments. Participants needed transportation to get to school, treatment programs, job
interviews, court dates and many of them did not have the means to make it to required
appointments on their own. A representative of the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney’s
Office described the dilemma as such:
“…getting kids to take help is the toughest. Then, getting kids that do take help to stay in
the program is extremely difficult. Because you're talking about high risk kids that have
every bad layer - one topped on another. Transportation was huge issue or lack of
transportation to and from meetings, appointments, court. You know, you needed to have
someone who is pretty much law enforcement that could…that was able to handle a kid,
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take them all around, drive them, had insurance to drive them and had the right
temperament to drive. And when you, if you had 14 kids at a time and you have one grant
person, one [person] can't do it. So, transportation could be an issue.”

As corroborated by a representative of the BRAVE Team, one of the hardest things was
battling the transportation issue that some of the participants faced. Many of them either did not
have reliable transportation and many more had no transportation at all. This was a barrier to the
individual’s success. While they wanted to participate and stay on the straight and narrow, many
times they could not because what was needed was not available – in this instance,
transportation. At least half of the respondents validated the fact that one individual shouldered
most of the responsibility of transporting the participants to job interviews, court dates, service
provider appointments, and went on to convey that in order to adequately meet the needs of all of
the participants, more individuals were needed to complete this task.
Major Events That Affected Sustainability
There were several events that occurred beginning in the summer of 2016 that ultimately
affected the sustainability of the BRAVE program. The summer shootings of 2016, the flood of
2016 and the mayoral transition.
Summer Shootings of 2016
On July 5, 2016, officers responding to a 911 call at the Triple S Food Mart on Fairfields
Avenue and North Foster Drive arrived to investigate a report of an individual outside of the
store with a gun. Officers Blane Salamoni and Howie Lake encountered 37-year-old, Alton
Sterling, who was in the front of the store selling CD’s. Based on video footage, a struggle
ensued, and Mr. Sterling was shot and killed. Autopsy results conducted by the East Baton
Rouge Parish Coroner’s Office indicated that Mr. Sterling died from multiple gunshot wounds to
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his back and chest. There was outrage across the city as well as the country as Mr. Sterling was
now another black male that had been gunned down by police.
On July 6th, the Governor of Louisiana requested that the United States Department of
Justice open a civil rights investigation. At this time, various cell phone videos of the incident
began to emerge and spread on social media. While this sparked protests across the city of Baton
Rouge and the country, on this same day in Falcon Heights, Minnesota, 32-year-old Philando
Castile was killed during a traffic stop while a companion in the car streamed a 10-minute
Facebook Live video.
Tensions were running at an all-time high in Baton Rouge and all police officers were
being deployed in different areas of the city. There were marches from Cortana Mall down
Airline Highway, protests and rallies held at the State Capitol and vigils taking place daily in
front of the Triple S Mart where Mr. Sterling was killed. Tensions were so bad between citizens,
particularly those in predominately black neighborhoods, and police that President Barack
Obama held an event that proposed finding ways to bridge the divide between police and the
community as well as updating police training and tactics. Governor John Bel Edwards and
Louisiana State Police Colonel Mike Edmonson attended this event in Washington, D.C.
arguably in hopes of showing a sign of good faith to the citizens of the State of Louisiana.
To exacerbate matters, two days after Alton Sterling’s funeral, on Sunday, July 17, 2016
at roughly 8:45a, 29-year-old ex-Marine Gavin Long, shot six police officers in Baton Rouge.
Long was first spotted in the area of Hammond Aire Shopping Center where he appeared to be
scouting the area. A call into the 911 Call Center around that time indicated that there was a
suspicious person carrying a rifle near the shopping center. The sequence of events that would
occur next were horrifying. In search of officers to presumably shoot and kill, which was not
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known until later, Long parked behind a beauty supply store with his car stocked with high
powered weapons and ammunition. Long eventually opened fire killing Baton Rouge City Police
Officers Montrell Jackson and Matthew Gerald and East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Deputy
Brad Garafola. Three other officers were hospitalized – one critically. This not only increased
tension in the city, but around the country as well especially since this was the second shooting
of multiple police officers that had occurred in less than two weeks. Prior to this incident, Micah
Alexander ambushed police officers in Dallas, Texas killing five of the officers and injuring nine
others. This particular shooting occurred at the end of gathering in Dallas where people were
protesting the killings of Alton Sterling and Philando Castile.
Flood of 2016
The next major event that occurred in the Baton Rouge area that contributed to the
stymieing of the BRAVE program was the Flood of 2016. According to the National Weather
Service:
“The Louisiana Flood of 2016 was triggered by a complicated slow-moving low-pressure
weather system that dumped as much as two feet of rain on parts of East Baton Rouge
Parish, Livingston and St. Helena parishes in a 48-hour period. The record two-day
rainfall event had a 0.1 percent chance of occurring in any year, making it the equivalent
of a “1,000-year rain event.”
Beginning on the night of Thursday, August 11, 2016, tremendous amounts of rain began
falling across the city dumping more than 24 inches of rain in some areas. By Friday, August 12,
2016, people were already being rescued by boat from the rapidly rising water around their
homes. Homes, businesses, and schools were damaged. Upwards of 150,000 residents were
either forced to live in hotels or state operated shelters.
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Not only were residents displaced, but so were first responders – many of them displaced
twice – from their residents and from their jobs. While having to maintain their mantra of serving
others first, approximately 600 employees either had homes that flooded or had homes that were
significantly impacted. While they were dealing with having to relocate themselves and their
families, many of the city’s buildings were flooded as well, so countless employees were
displaced from primary job location. There were two EMS stations, two Baton Rouge Fire
Department Stations, two St. George Fire Department Stations, several volunteer stations that
were flooded as well as 136 Baton Rouge Police Department and Sheriff’s Office vehicles that
flooded (Gallo 2016).
A representative of the BRAVE Team explained the Flood of 2016 in this way:
“2016 was during the time that, that we experienced the flood in the city…and that flood
that I like to refer to as the flood of equality, because it didn't discriminate against
anybody. So, it affected the rich. It affected the poor and [it] affected the middle class. It
affected the people on the north side of Baton Rouge, the south side of Baton
Rouge…when you passed down the street that trash in front of that $600,000 house, it
looked just like the trash that was sitting in front of that $50,000 house. It didn't
discriminate. And I think 2016 was such a…such a very hard year for everyone that, you
know, when people were just displaced and things, that I just don't think people had a
chance to focus on a lot of crime, to be honest, because you know…what are you going
to do? Steal my trash. I have nothing.”
One respondent summed up the effect of the Shootings of 2016 and the Flood of
2016 like this:
“It was multiple things happening [at the same time]. But instead of the focus [being on
BRAVE], where we had dedicated law enforcement patrols in targeted areas to be a
deterrent, so, these officers that would normally be dedicated to do certain things now
they had to be pulled off of that…now you’re on special assignment for this…you know,
so we couldn't, we just…because we were short on manpower. We couldn’t dedicate
those officers for that need [BRAVE]. We needed them elsewhere and that lasted a good
while.”
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Ultimately, the efforts to reduce violent crime in the targeted areas of zip codes 70802 and 70805
was no longer feasible because of those major events. Many law enforcement personnel as well
as other resource personnel services were redirected to other areas and efforts throughout the
city.

Mayoral Transition
On December 10, 2016, Sharon Weston Broome was elected Mayor/President of East
Baton Rouge Parish. She succeeded term limited, outgoing Mayor/President Kip Holden, who
had served 12 years as the city’s first African American mayor. The initial BRAVE grant was
administered under Mayor Kip Holden in 2012. Things began to go awry in early 2017 during
incoming Mayor Broome’s administration. One respondent indicated that the mayoral transition,
particularly the employee turnover and the large amount of money that had not been utilized
from the grant, was the key reason behind the failure of BRAVE:
“…And I don't think it was because of a lack of interest from the law enforcement
agencies. I think they were…they were being pulled back by political constraints. But
other than that, I mean we pretty much followed the rules. But, until the transition
happened…once the transition happened, it [BRAVE] was a goner. There were no, you
know…the city didn't seem to understand that you couldn't just take the money and spend
it…and then there was a huge amount of money left over because the individual they
finally hired to run the program was not getting…was not working with the federal
agency to be able to spend the money [properly]. And a lot of that had to do with
personnel that never could be hired. Other things like we put money in [into the grant] to
pay for overtime for police and to pay overtime for Sheriff's Deputies and they chose not
to do that. They said they would pay from their own budgets, so we had a huge amount
of money and we couldn't…the person that was in charge of program from the mayor's
office kept saying she was working with the federal agency to find a way to spend the
money but she wasn't.”
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On July 18, 2016, Baton Rouge officials were informed that the federal government was
pulling the plug on the BRAVE grant money effective September 18, 2016. At that point, the
city had thousands of unused dollars that the fiscal agent requested to carry forward, but this
request was denied. Per the Department of Justice, the decision not to extend the grant was for a
number of reasons: (1) the department only allowed for one extension every twelve months – the
city had already received two extensions; (2) mismanagement of the grant; (3) missed deadlines
to provide reports to the feds/not enough data on success of the program; and (4) failure to show
services in application were actually being provided (Gallo 2017).
One of the respondents spoke specifically about receiving the original extension and
some of the issues that arose:
“We had an extension one time. We were able to get an extension because of the
circumstances, but when the personnel changed, the new people were put in place…one
of the folders had the time limits, the timeframes on when you [the grant coordinator] had
to submit, when the coordinator had to submit for an extension with the proposals for
new service providers. So, if you took the job and inherited this desk and you have a
group of folders like it is now, you have to look through those folders to familiarize
yourself with what's needed and what's time sensitive…and that created a problem.”

As the bickering between the new administration and the previous administration grew
more contentious, each blamed the other for the demise of the BRAVE program. The previous
administration claimed the new administration missed an important reporting deadline which
triggered the freezing of funds, but the fact cannot be ignored that the Justice Department had
advised the previous administration on two occasions in 2016 that key information was missing
from their reports and it needed to be addressed. In summer of 2017, a request of an audit of the
program was made after a flurry of irregularities were brought to light. Accusations were made
that the new mayor cancelled the contract with the LSU Academic Research Team and was
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attempting to divert monies outside of BRAVE by having various camps and awarding funds to
persons who were not worthy nor reputable in an effort to utilize the funds before the deadline.
On August 1, 2017, with the BRAVE program now in limbo, all BRAVE contracts were
suspended by the mayor’s office pending further review.
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Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Overview
What works to combat violent crime is something that law enforcement officials,
researchers and policy makers have wrestled with for centuries. Using focused deterrence
approaches, several cities have reported significant reductions in gun related violence (Braga,
Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl 2001a; Braga, Kennedy, Piehl and Waring 2001b; Braga et al. 2006;
Chermak and McGarrell 2004; McGarrell, et al. 2006). Focused deterrence strategies honor core
deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by offenders, while finding new and creative
ways of deploying traditional and nontraditional law enforcement tools to do so, such as directly
communicating incentives and disincentives to targeted offenders (Kennedy 1997, 2008). The
focused deterrence model demands a great deal of coordination both within and between the law
enforcement, services, and community partners to operate effectively and efficiently (Engel,
Corsaro and Tillyer 2010).
My research for this study drew upon the deterrence theory and social disorganization
theory as both theories have a relationship between crime and the community. Deterrence theory
is a theory of crime that presumes that human beings are rational enough to consider the
consequences of their actions and to be influenced by those consequences (Paternoster 2010).
Under general deterrence theory, persons are punished for violating the criminal law to serve as
object lessons for the rest of society (Kennedy 1983). Focused deterrence, as its name implies,
focuses official and community attention and resources on the relatively few individuals who
commit a disproportionate number of crimes, typically violent crimes, and removes any sense of
anonymity they might believe they enjoy (Scott 2017). A key component to the focused
deterrence initiatives that were analyzed in this study was ensuring that the message of the
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program – violence must stop - was communicated effectively to those who not only attended the
call-ins, but those who did not attend. The intent was that those who attended the call-ins would
convey the message to others involved in gang and/or group violence within the community in a
concerted effort to thwart any future violence.
As stated in the review of the literature, social disorganization theory emphasized the
inability of a neighborhood to achieve the common goals of its residents and maintain effective
social controls (Kornhauser 1978; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Extending the earlier versions of
social disorganization theory, Sampson and Groves (1989) predicted that neighborhood
structural characteristics, such as low socio-economic status, residential mobility, racial
heterogeneity, and family disruption, are exogenous sources of social disorganization that lead to
the disruption of local social organizations. As per the theory, poverty, residential mobility,
ethnic heterogeneity and weak social networks decrease a neighborhoods capacity to control the
behavior of people in public, and hence increase the likelihood of crime (Kubrin and Wietzer
2003). This directly relates to and is appropriate for the focused deterrence studies highlighted in
the dissertation. The findings in this study fits concisely within the framework of social
disorganization theory in that areas of communities where there are ineffective levels of social
controls, above average female headed households and poverty as well as racial heterogeneity
can lead to high levels of crime.
5.2 Summary of Findings
Several significant conclusions can be made from this dissertation in association with the
research questions highlighted. Under Operation Ceasefire, and other similarly replicated
initiatives, police teamed up with community leaders to identify the young men most at risk of
shooting someone or being shot, talked to them directly about the risks they faced, offered them
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support, and promised a tough crackdown on the groups that continued the shooting (Beckett
2015). The findings highlight definitively that the violent crime rate is, in fact, responsive to the
focused deterrence initiatives studied. In each jurisdiction studied and analyzed in this
dissertation, immediate declines were seen in violent crime, some were slight while others were
significant. Beginning with the original Operation Ceasefire, violent gang offending slowed
dramatically, and youth homicide in Boston fell by two-thirds (63%) after the strategy was put
into place (Kennedy 1998) while Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles showed a much smaller
decrease at 28%. This could have been due to the fact that the Los Angeles initiative was only
employed for a six-month intervention period. These findings suggest that the message delivered
at the call-ins along with the pulling levers approach and the certainty that severe prosecution
would be forthcoming played a major role in the decrease in the crime rate.
Several factors indicate that the crime rate was responsive to the focused deterrence
initiatives. First, and most impactful, was the presence of law enforcement within the
community. Increased patrols have generally been known to have some level of deterrence;
however, it has also been shown that increased patrols may displace some of the violent crime.
To illustrate that fact, in the first year of implementation of the BRAVE program, murder arrests
in target area 70805 declined while murder arrests in the 70802-zip code increased (Figure 12).
However, according to Criminologist Dr. Edward Shihadeh (2012), despite some displacement
of violent crime to the 70802-zip code, there had been an overall decline in the murder rate in the
city of Baton Rouge.
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Figure 12. Murder Arrests by Month – Baton Rouge

A second factor that was noted to be a contributor to the decreasing crime rate was the social
services component of the programs. As an element of the focused deterrence initiative, social
services, treatment programs, educational and employment opportunities were offered to all
participants if they agreed not to engage in violence. Individuals who did take advantage of the
services provided through the programs were actually able to increase educational levels, obtain
employment, etc. One particular instance as highlighted by a BRAVE Project Representative
explained one young man’s pathway to success in the program via utilizing the services offered:
“…that brings me to a win. One of the youth - a couple of them told me - you
know what, so you telling me I gotta stop selling drugs and I'm going to get paid
$6 an hour at McDonald's and this is going to supposedly replace the money that I
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was making selling drugs? All I could tell him at that time was that selling drugs
was illegal and you’re going to eventually get caught and they were going to go to
jail. I reached out to Exxon…well, Exxon had some subcontractors like Turner
Industries. So, Turner Industries agreed to hire the youth on at $14 an hour if they
were able to report to work in a faithful, you know, routine and abide by their
rules and stay drug free. And they had a built-in training that had certifications
with welding, pipe fitting, plumbing, carpentry, and they would actually put them
through these certifications that were recognized statewide three months after
being hired on. So, we had only two that were able to complete that…that was
the biggest success stories. And what was so cool about it, you would like this, a
participating faith-based organization, they had a car that they allowed the young
man to pay for on time so that he could get to work. So, he was actually leasing
the car, leasing to own, from the church. So, as soon as he had enough money,
then that money that he was paying to use the car to go to and from work, he was
able to purchase that car. So, it just - it doesn't sound that big, because we take so
much for granted - for him to not have transportation, we bought him a bicycle
first. And then after he was riding a bicycle to work at the local jobs, were able to
get him on to the bigger paying job at Turner. So, he went from like, $7 an hour to
$14 an hour, but he could not ride the bike to Turner Industries. So, we - the
church - said that they would let him use a car, but he didn’t have to pay so much
money for the car. It was a small amount to us, but large to him. He got the car,
didn't wreck the car, took care of it, and then was able to actually purchase the car
and keep the job there. So, it…it made me feel so good to be a part of a success
story. And it was some of the success stories that went unnoticed just the fact, for
some of them to not - recidivism was a big deal – for them not become a repeat
offender. And even though they didn't get the job sometimes, they were able to
put the guns down and finish their education. So many of them got GED’s, um,
so many of them continued their education. The problem was most of these guys
were three years behind their class. So, a lot of people frowned upon the GED’s.
But have you tried to put yourself in their shoes? Being picked at, the ridicule of
being older at school…we would always encourage that [for them to get their
education], I want you to know that we wanted to encourage them to continue at
this goal [inaudible 37:40] Let’s do this GED. So, that was some successes that I
wanted to mention.”
A third factor that influenced the crime rate positively was community involvement. As noted in
many of the focused deterrence initiatives, many of the major stakeholders in the programs
participated in community events that encouraged residents to mix and mingle with law
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enforcement and other major stakeholders. Taking part in these activities allowed both the
residents and the law enforcement personnel to each gain respect for the other and work on
building long lasting trust between the two within the community.
The second research question addressed a whiplash effect in crime. While this is by no
means an in-depth study, until now, previous studies and evaluations of focused deterrence
initiatives highlighted violent crime rates through the post-intervention period. The postintervention period has been defined as the period from the first call in through the end of the
initiative including the two years after the end of the program. While casual observations have
been made, there has not been a study, to my knowledge, that has specifically addressed a
whiplash effect. A whiplash effect is considered a spike in crime rates following the end of a
program/initiative. Three of the cities, Boston, Lowell, and Cincinnati, showed a decline in
homicides in the first year following the end of the initiative. The second year following the end
of the initiatives showed significant increases. The other two cities, Los Angeles – Hollenbeck
and Baton Rouge, showed immediate spikes in the crime rate.
There are several possible explanations for the increases in these cities. The Hollenbeck
area of Los Angeles has a long history of gang activity within that community. With gang crime
severely entrenched, it is unlikely that an initiative lasting only a few months would make a
meaningful impact on the violent crime rates. In Baton Rouge, a series of tragic events occurred
that potentially contributed to the immediate spike in crime. There was the shooting of Alton
Sterling and the ambushing of Baton Rouge Law Enforcement Officials. Any tension that had
been resolved between the police and the community up to this point was elevated again during
this time. Concurrent with these events was the massive flood of 2016 that damaged over
100,000 homes or rendered them uninhabitable. This had an enormously disorganizing effect on
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communities, which Chicago School theorizing predicts will raise the crime rate. Such
theorizing was spot on in New Orleans, where hurricane Katrina severely damaged the city,
resulting in a massive crime spike in the years that followed.
5.3 Limitations
While analyzing the evaluation reports and transcribing the interviews, there were a few
issues that impeded the complete success of this dissertation. Limitations to the study include
issues with the definition of violent crime, access to data, and lack of access to major
stakeholders.
First, each of the jurisdictions in the study defined violent crime in a different manner.
While violent crime as defined by the UCR includes murder, rape, robbery and aggravated
assault, this was not the case with the studies. The overall violent crime rate variables for each
program was broken down as such: (1) Operation Ceasefire (Boston) – youth homicide and
youth gun violence; (2) Operation Ceasefire (Los Angeles) – homicides, attempted homicides,
robberies, assaults and kidnappings; (3) Project Safe Neighborhoods (Lowell) – gun homicides
and gun aggravated assaults; (4) Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence – homicides,
Group/Gang Member Involved (GMI) Homicides, Non-GMI homicides, violent firearms
incidents and non-shooting violent incidents; (5) Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination –
Murder, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, and Illegal Use of Weapons. To get a true indication of
the violent crime rate in the manner in which the jurisdictions defined violent crime would have
been extremely time consuming. Each of the jurisdictions did include homicide as a variable, so
for the purposes of this study, the data for the whiplash effect came from the decision to
disaggregate the homicide variable from what the jurisdictions considered their overall violent
crime rate.
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Another limitation to the study was not having the opportunity to interview all of the
major stakeholders in the BRAVE program. Representatives from the Mayor’s Office (under
former Mayor Kip Holden), Office of Juvenile Services and the Apostolic Restoration Church
did not respond to my request for an interview. Although no request was made to the current
mayor’s administration for an interview, I was able to obtain a copy of the Status Report on the
BRAVE Project. While I was able to obtain a great deal of information from the representatives
of the remaining major stakeholder organizations, I believe having information from the previous
mayor’s administration would have been extremely helpful as they were the fiscal agent and
ultimately played a significant role in the securing and administration of the program. Also, the
Office of Juvenile Services played a major role in the BRAVE program from its inception. Since
most of the initiatives were geared toward youth ages 15 – 24 in most areas, a representative
from this agency would have been able to offer a wealth of information as it relates to the
program and the progression of the individuals who were participating.
Finally, on the qualitative portion of the study, after transcription, coding and writing had
begun, I did feel like some follow-up interviews were necessary. Not that the information
presented in the study was lacking or insufficient in any way, but additional questioning and
clarification on certain topics with respondents would have garnered richer data.
5.4 Suggestions for Future Research
Despite the fact that all of the focused deterrence initiatives have shown varying levels of
success after implementation, sustainability has proven to be a recurring issue with all of the
initiatives. As discussed in the analysis section, there has been a fluctuation in the violent crime
rates during the post-intervention period through the two years following the conclusion of the
initiatives. Beginning with the original Operation Ceasefire, efforts to ensure the various
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programs maintained positive results were met with challenges. This is why future research must
address different methods to ensure that the initiatives are sustainable.
One suggestion that may positively impact the sustainability of focused deterrence
initiatives might be to address the structure of the programs. Although it is of the utmost
importance to have a variety of individual stakeholders that represent different participating
agencies, employee turnover, infighting, and just overall diminishing enthusiasm about the
initiatives have led to the downfall of many of the programs. If there were one central office that
was responsible for fiscal management as well as day to day operations, this might positively
affect the overall sustainability of the initiatives. Here, there would be several individuals whose
sole responsibility would be maintaining the viability of the programs.
Another suggestion that may render the programs more sustainable would be focusing on
having a proactive program as opposed to a reactive program. Most of the focused deterrence
initiatives were born because of the increasing crime rate in a particular area or a triggering event
in that area. In these situations, specifically in places like the Hollenbeck area of Los Angeles,
law enforcement entered neighborhoods pulling all levers subsequently not giving potential
participants the opportunity to be assisted through social services and other treatment and/or
educational programs. While trying to combat crime is definitely an urgent matter, we must also
be mindful that many residents of these communities are impacted by structural, cultural, and
socioeconomic barriers. Trying to address those issues within the communities first, might
sometime in the near future, eliminate the need for focused deterrence initiatives all together.
Programs like focused deterrence initiatives have proven to be successful. In order to
ensure the longevity of the programs, developing a sustainability model is essential. First, the
structure of the programs should be addressed. As stated by half of the respondents in the
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interviews, there was an issue as to which entity would be the face of the BRAVE program – law
enforcement or resource providers. If there is a central office with stable leadership, then that
would address the employee turnover that many of the focused deterrence initiatives experienced
which led to the demise of some of the programs. Advantages of having a central office would
be securing dedicated employees specifically for the program, having written policies and
procedures in place for continuity in the event of employee turnover and guaranteeing a central
office to immediately address any issues within the day-to-day operations of the program.
Second, focused deterrence initiatives should look to expand the resource providers by including
more representation from business and industry. By doing this, initiatives would increase the
number of training and employment opportunities for program participants as well as potential
monetary support of the programs through donations. And last, initiatives should look to expand
funding sources. Most of the focused deterrence initiatives begin as federally funded programs
with a predetermined amount of money awarded to each initiative as well as a fixed time frame
in which to utilize the funds. To increase the sustainability of the initiatives, municipalities could
include dedicated funding in their budgets for the programs or consider utilizing social impact
bonds. Social impact bonds represent a new way to finance social service and health promotion
programs whereby different types of investors provide upfront investment of capital (Katz,
Brisbois, Zerger, and Hwang 2018).
5.5 Conclusion
It is a well-known fact that group dynamics drives violence in certain areas of major
cities. It has also been shown that violence is carried out by a small group of individuals who
tend to be repeat offenders. Research has proven that there is a growing body of evidence that
focused deterrence strategies, such as the pulling levers approach pioneered by Operation
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Ceasefire in Boston, generate significant crime reduction benefits (Braga, Hureau, and
Papachristos 2014). Evaluations of focused deterrence strategies designed to prevent gang
violence ascertain that citywide trends in youth homicide (Braga et al. 2001) or gang member
involved homicides (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009) were reduced as a result of the interventions.
Evaluation research, which “aims to improve society by examining social policies through the
use of various research methodologies,” is crucial to the development, monitoring, and
assessment of criminal justice policy (Mears 2010). It is programs like the focused deterrence
initiatives highlighted in the analysis that when implemented properly and replicated across the
country can suppress occurrences of violent crime. But are these programs sustainable? That is
the bigger question.
While there have been numerous jurisdictions that have attempted to mimic Operation
Ceasefire, many failed due to non-compliance with the fidelity of the program. That was not the
issue with the BRAVE program. After interviewing the major stakeholders who participated in
the program, it was clear that the program fidelity as outlined by Kennedy was followed. From
the data gathered, the BRAVE program appeared to collapse not due to the failure of the subject
matter experts, but city administration officials. As stated by Braga, Hureau and Winship
(2008):
“It is challenging to sustain effective collaborations over time. No one institution by itself
can mount a meaningful response to complex youth violence problems. Institutions need
to coordinate and combine efforts in ways that could magnify their separate effects.”

91

Commitment is needed in several areas to continue to ensure that the focused deterrence
initiatives that are implemented can have a longstanding, positive effect. Like BRAVE, many
focused deterrence initiatives appeared on the surface to be amazing programs that showed
remarkable signs of initial success at combatting violent crime. But, unfortunately, violent crime
has shown significant increases shortly after the programs are dissolved. Ultimately, the success
of focused deterrence initiatives has been proven, but more research must be done in order to
assess what steps should be taken to sustain the programs to maintain low violent crime rates in
communities in the United States.
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Appendix A. Organizational Structure for Focused Deterrence Initiatives

(Rand Corporation 2019)
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Appendix B. Map of BRAVE Target Areas
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Appendix C. Information on Major Stakeholders
Original Partnering Organization

Participated in Interview

Office of Mayor/President
District Attorney’s Office

X

Baton Rouge Police Department
East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office

X

Louisiana State Police
Department of Juvenile Services
Louisiana State University Research Team

X

BRAVE Office (2 representatives)

X

Capital Area Human Services District

X

Dream Center

X

Hope Ministries
Living Faith Cathedral*

X

Apostolic Restoration Church*
*Not included in BRAVE grant, but participated in initiative periodically

107

Appendix D. IRB Approval
ACTION ON EXEMPTION APPROVAL REQUEST
TO:

Chandra Joseph
Sociology

FROM:

Dennis Landin
Chair, Institutional Review Board

DATE:

January 22, 2019

RE:

IRB# E11445

TITLE:

The Life and Death of Focused Deterrence Initiatives

Institutional Review Board
Dr. Dennis Landin, Chair
130 David Boyd Hall
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
P: 225.578.8692
F: 225.578.5983
irb@lsu.edu
lsu.edu/research

New Protocol/Modification/Continuation: New Protocol
Review Date: 1/18/2019
Approved

X

Disapproved

Approval Date: 1/22/2019 Approval Expiration Date: 1/21/2022
Exemption Category/Paragraph: 2a
Signed Consent Waived?: No
Re-review frequency: (three years unless otherwise stated)
LSU Proposal Number (if applicable):
By: Dennis Landin, Chairman
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING –
Continuing approval is CONDITIONAL on:

1. Adherence to the approved protocol, familiarity with, and adherence to the ethical standards of the Belmont Report,
and LSU's Assurance of Compliance with DHHS regulations for the protection of human subjects*
2. Prior approval of a change in protocol, including revision of the consent documents or an increase in the number of
subjects over that approved.
3. Obtaining renewed approval (or submittal of a termination report), prior to the approval expiration date, upon request
by the IRB office (irrespective of when the project actually begins); notification of project termination.
4. Retention of documentation of informed consent and study records for at least 3 years after the study ends.
5. Continuing attention to the physical and psychological well-being and informed consent of the individual participants,
including notification of new information that might affect consent.
6. A prompt report to the IRB of any adverse event affecting a participant potentially arising from the study.
7. Notification of the IRB of a serious compliance failure.
8. SPECIAL NOTE: When emailing more than one recipient, make sure you use bcc. Approvals will
automatically be closed by the IRB on the expiration date unless the PI requests a continuation.

* All investigators and support staff have access to copies of the Belmont Report, LSU's Assurance with DHHS, DHHS
(45 CFR 46) and FDA regulations governing use of human subjects, and other relevant documents in print in this
office or on our World Wide Web site at http://www.lsu.edu/irb

108

Appendix E. Consent Form
1. Study Title:

The Rise and Fall of Focus Deterrence Initiatives

2. Performance Site:

Stakeholder’s worksites

3. Investigator:

Chandra L. Joseph (225) 252-0903
Available M – F, 8a – 4:30p
Dr. Lori L. Martin (225) 578-1785
Available M - F, 8a – 4:30p

4. Purpose of the Study:
The purpose of the study is to see what issues Baton Rouge
Area Violence (BRAVE) program organizers encountered, what were the impediments to
the success of the of the program and determine its effectiveness.
5. Subject Inclusion:
Members of the law enforcement, courts, corrections
system as well as faith-based community partners and community service providers.
6. Number of Subjects:

15

7. Study Procedures:
Study will be conducted by interviewing each of the
participants for approximately 60 minutes. The interview will be audio recorded. The
interview questions will pertain to the successes, failures and sustainability of the
BRAVE program.
8. Benefits:

There are no real benefits to participating in this study.

9. Risks:

There are no risks to study participants.

10. Right to Refuse:
time.

Subjects may choose not to participate or withdraw at any

11. Privacy:
Results of the study may be published. If participant wishes
to remain anonymous, pseudonyms will be used, and the subject’s identity will remain
confidential.
12. Financial Information:
Participants will not receive any monetary or in-kind
benefits for taking part in the study.
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13. Signatures:
The study has been discussed with me and all of my
questions have been answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics
to the investigator. If I have questions about subject’s rights or other concerns, I can
contact, Dennis Landin, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, (225)578-8692. I
agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the researchers’
obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by me.

Subject Signature: ___________________________________ Date: ________________________

110

Appendix F. Interview Questions
The purpose of this interview is to elicit feedback on the BRAVE program, a focused deterrence

initiative, that was implemented in 2012 in the 70805-zip code in East Baton Rouge Parish. I
hope to be able to get an idea of the effectiveness of the program, outline programmatic fidelity
and see where the successes and failures of the program were.
1. What is your name?
2. Were you a part of the program as a major stakeholder in one of the original participating
organizations?
a. If yes, what was your role?
b. If no, at what point did you become involved with the BRAVE program and what
was your role?
3. Tell me about the BRAVE program.
4. Why was the BRAVE program developed?
5. What was the goal of the BRAVE program?
6. How did those who attended the call-ins respond?
7. Was there a noticeable (actual/perceived) decrease in gang/group violence and/or crime?
8. Were there any identifiable problems at the outset of the program?
a. As time went on?
9. What were the successes of the program?
10. Were there any impediments to the success of the program?
11. What was the overall community reaction/response to the program?
12. Did community members get involved?
a. If so, to what extant? Was the community (residents) more organized because of
BRAVE?
b. If not, what do you believe the barriers were?
13. Were there any events that either positively or negatively affected the sustainability of the
BRAVE program?
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Appendix F. Interview Questions (Continued)
14. Understanding programmatic fidelity, would you say that the BRAVE program followed
the specific outline of Kennedy’s focused deterrence initiatives?
15. How would you improve the program?
16. Is there anything that you would like to add?
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Appendix G. Map of Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles (Hollenbeck)
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Appendix H. BRAVE Organizational Chart

Office of the City of
Baton Rouge/EBRP
Mayor President
LSU Research Team
East Baton Rouge
Parish Sheriff's
Office

Baton Rouge Police
Department

BRAVE Project
Representative A

BRAVE Project
Representative B

East Baton Rouge
Parish District
Attorney

BRAVE
Administrative Staff

Other Law
Enfocement

Faith-Based
Organizations

Service Providers
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Industry

Appendix I. Messaging Campaign Examples

115

Vita
Chandra. Lynore Joseph is a native of New Iberia, Louisiana and currently resides in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. She received her Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice from
Southern University and A & M College in Baton Rouge and her Master of Science degree in
Criminal Justice with a concentration in Criminal Investigations from Southern University and A
& M College in Baton Rouge. She will receive her Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology during the
Summer 2019 commencement ceremony. She is currently employed at Baton Rouge Community
College as an Assistant Professor and the Program Manager in the Criminal Justice Department.
In July 2019, she will begin her appointment as the Chair of the Social Sciences and History
Department at Baton Rouge Community College.

116

